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Blocking Copyrights Revisited 
Kelly Casey Mullally 
ABSTRACT 
Copyright law’s constitutional mandate is to advance artistic progress for the 
public good by granting authors a set of exclusive rights.  When considered in the 
context of creative endeavors that build upon preexisting, already copyrighted 
works, however, this seemingly straightforward objective becomes more 
complicated:  in this situation, the law must balance the incentive to prepare the 
initial work with the incentive for improvement and continued progress in the form 
of derivative works, which can be inhibited by the rights conferred on the author of 
the preexisting work.  Indeed, allowing individuals broad rights to exclude the 
public, for the benefit of the public, presents a contradiction in intellectual property 
law when those individual rights are invoked to prohibit absolutely the production 
of derivative works, as some courts have permitted copyright litigants to do. 
A blocking copyrights doctrine would help to relieve that uneasy and 
unnecessary result.  Such a doctrine would be similar to the well-established 
blocking patents approach to overlapping inventions in intellectual property law, 
and would allow an unauthorized improver of a preexisting copyrighted work to 
practice, and retain rights to, the original contributions in her derivative work, 
subject to compensation for use of the preexisting work.  In addition to looking to 
patent law for guidance, the law relating to improvers of tangible property is also 
instructive in addressing the dilemma of unauthorized derivative authors in the 
copyright system:  that body of law offers even greater acceptance and 
encouragement of the efforts of subsequent users of property. 
Although copyright law, when compared to both patent law and the law of 
tangible property, presents equally, if not more, compelling reasons for granting an 
improver relief, a blocking doctrine has not been accepted by the courts in the 
copyright context.  As this Article demonstrates, courts’ failure to accept the 
doctrine is in part due to a misunderstanding of the statutory provisions governing 
derivative works.  In addition to correcting this misunderstanding, the Article 
points to recent decisions relating to remedies in copyright cases that further open 
the door to implementation of a doctrine of blocking copyrights.  Taking this 
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opportunity to incorporate the more favorable treatment of improvers seen in cases 
involving tangible property, this Article suggests that courts revisit copyright law’s 
treatment of unauthorized improvers and utilize key principles of a blocking 
copyrights doctrine in the remedies stage of an infringement action.  Specifically, 
this Article argues that courts should use the relief granted to copyright plaintiffs 
as a vehicle to allow for a more nuanced, principled approach to infringement by 
unauthorized derivative authors.  This Article suggests criteria for when and how 
courts should incorporate into their remedies determinations features of the law 
that more appropriately account for the contributions of improvers, thereby 
effecting important aspects of a blocking copyrights doctrine, if not wholesale 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of Aesop’s fables tells the story of an encounter between a vexatious dog 
and a hungry ox: 
A dog looking for a quiet and comfortable place to take a nap jumped into the manger 
of the ox and lay there on the hay.  Some time later the ox, returning hungry from his 
day’s work, entered his stall and found the dog in his manger.  The dog, in a rage 
because he had been awakened from his nap, stood up and barked and snapped 
whenever the ox came near his hay.  The ox is a patient beast, but finally he protested:  
“Dog, if you wanted to eat my dinner I would have no objection.  However, you will 
neither eat it yourself nor let me enjoy it, which strikes me as a very churlish way to 
act.”1 
The moral of Aesop’s story concludes, “Some begrudge others what they cannot 
enjoy themselves.”2 
In copyright law, the potential for holdout behavior similar to that of the dog in 
the manger arises when one author3 creates a work that builds on the earlier work 
of another author.4  For instance, consider a hypothetical scenario involving a 
playwright who transforms an obscure short story into a critically acclaimed, 
award-winning play.  The playwright contributes significant new content to the 
short story, transforming not only its genre but also changing the plot, adding 
symbolism and dialogue and enhancing the story with other substantial creative 
elements.  The play infringes the copyright in the short story, because the 
playwright did not have the permission of the short story author, who—although he 
had no interest in developing the short story into a play himself—refused to grant a 
license because he was not cast in the play’s lead role.5  The play’s success, 
however, can be attributed nearly exclusively to the efforts of the playwright.  And 
without the play, the short story would have remained unknown and unprofitable. 
This scenario raises the issue of what rights the playwright and the short story 
author each have in the play.6  The Copyright Act defines works such as the play as 
“derivative works.”7  Authors of derivative works often make valuable 
 
 1. AESOP, The Dog in the Manger, AESOP’S FABLES 1, 1 (Grosset & Dunlap eds., 1982). 
 2. Id. 
 3. The term “author” broadly refers to a creator of any type of copyrightable work.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (providing that “works of authorship” eligible for copyright protection include 
literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural and architectural works, among 
others). 
 4. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of Property Rules, 
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2094 (1997) (noting that the problem of holdout arises when a first party requires a 
unique commodity owned by a second party, and the first party values the commodity more than the 
second party, but the second party refuses to deal for idiosyncratic strategic reasons). 
 5. The playwright’s incorporation of elements from the short story infringes either the short 
story author’s right to reproduce the preexisting work, or his right to prepare derivative works, or both.  
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and (2) (2012) (setting out copyright holders’ rights). 
 6. For resolution of this scenario, see infra Part II. 
 7. A “derivative work” is defined as: 
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
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contributions to preexisting works, and derivative works “can provide social 
benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new 
one.”8  To be protectable, a derivative work must be significantly different from the 
preexisting work.9  Determining what the parties’ respective rights are in a 
derivative work depends on whether the law will tolerate “dog-in-the-manger” 
reactions to other authors’ derivative works, such as the play. 
Looking to the foundations of copyright protection, a key precept of the law is to 
encourage the production of creative works by granting authors a set of exclusive 
economic rights.10  The Constitution gives Congress the power to issue that set of 
rights for one purpose:  “To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”11  
The system is thus a utilitarian one, wherein an author receives an incentive in the 
form of her bundle of economic rights in furtherance of the desire to benefit the 
learning, culture and development of the public as a whole.12 
When dealing with works derived from preexisting copyrighted works, however, 
this goal becomes less one-dimensional.  In this context, the law must consider not 
only the incentive to prepare the initial work but also the incentive for continued 
progress.13  This progress often takes the form of work that relies and builds upon 
preexisting works;14 it can therefore be inhibited by the exclusive rights granted to 
 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted.  A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other 
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 8. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (referring specifically to 
parody, a type of derivative work). 
 9. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that derivative work 
must be significantly different from underlying work to be copyrightable); Gracen v. Bradford 
Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (same); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 487 
(2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (holding that copyright in derivative work was invalid for lack of substantial 
variation from preexisting work in public domain). 
 10. A copyright holder receives the rights to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work, to distribute copies of the copyrighted work and, for 
certain types of works, the right to perform and display the copyrighted work publicly.  17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2012). 
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 12. Brett Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 123, 
128 (2011) (“There is widespread consensus among scholars that patent and copyright laws, at least in 
the United States, are fundamentally utilitarian.”); see also infra Part III.D (discussing utilitarian basis of 
copyright law and public welfare interest in copyright law). 
 13. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y 209, 211 (1983) (noting that derivative authors have “an equal claim on copyright’s system of 
investment incentives”). 
 14. In some sense, all works are influenced by the previous creations of others.  As Justice Story 
wrote: 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an 
abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. . . .  No man writes exclusively from his 
own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others.  The thoughts of every man 
are, more or less, a combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although they 
may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or reflection. 
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 
989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Nothing today, likely nothing since we 
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the author of the preexisting work.15  Indeed, an individual’s right to exclude the 
public—for the sake of the public—presents a great contradiction in intellectual 
property law.  Thomas Jefferson referred to this same calculus in the related context 
of patents as an “embarrassment.”16 
Experts and commentators have recognized this difficulty17 and the importance 
of balancing the incentive to prepare an initial work with the need to encourage 
improvements on that initial work and continued progress in the creative arts, and 
they have proposed reforms to achieve such a balance.18  In particular, scholars 
have suggested the possibility of a “blocking copyrights” regime, similar to the 
already established blocking patents doctrine.19  Blocking copyrights would allow 
 
tamed fire, is genuinely new:  Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new 
creator building on the works of those who came before.”); HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
AND LITERARY PROPERTY 1 (1944) (“All writers since time immemorial have been borrowers.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 
1217 (1996) (arguing that a broad, exclusive derivative works right offers copyright holders a windfall 
and fails to provide sufficient economic incentives for additional creative output to counterbalance the 
copyright holder’s rights). 
 16. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“Jefferson saw clearly the difficulty in 
‘drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent, and those which are not.’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 
1813), in BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 708, 712-13 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944))).  Like 
copyright protection, patent protection is based on the concept of granting rights to individuals for the 
sake of the greater good.  See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:  
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-30 (1989) (explaining theory of 
how patent monopolies function to promote progress by providing an incentive for individuals to invest 
in research and to disclose their inventions, thereby benefiting the general public). 
 17. Although copyright law’s doctrine of fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), frequently arises in 
infringement actions, reliance on that defense in the context of unauthorized derivative works presents at 
least two difficulties.  First, whether fair use will apply is too uncertain to justify the ex ante investment 
of resources that an improver might make.  The literature addressing the deficiencies of fair use is 
legion, with the critical shortcoming being a lack of predictability.  See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a 
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990) (noting that courts have failed to articulate a 
set of principles for analyzing fair use cases); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use 
Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2007) (“[A]pplication of the law [of fair use] has become so 
unpredictable that would-be fair-users can rarely rely on the doctrine with any significant level of 
confidence.”).  Fair use fails in an additional and more fundamental way, however, in that it does not 
give the improver any rights.  At best, fair use would protect an improver from paying damages to the 
underlying copyright holder, but it will not grant the improver the right to protect her work against 
copyists, including the creator of the underlying work. 
 18. See Christina Bohannan, Taming the Derivative Works Right:  A Modest Proposal for 
Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 669 (2010) 
(comparing Copyright Act to federal dog fighting statute and arguing for a narrow interpretation of 
Copyright Act to mitigate First Amendment concerns); Erin E. Gallagher, On the Fair Use Fence 
Between Derivative Works and Allegedly Infringing Creations:  A Proposal for a Middle Ground, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759 (2005) (arguing for a public domain middle ground rather than a “fair use 
fence” to address derivative works); Robert J. Morrison, Deriver’s Licenses:  An Argument for 
Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 87 (2006) 
(proposing legislative fix through implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme for derivative 
works). 
 19. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 1021, 1074-77 (1997) (arguing in favor of a rule of blocking copyrights); see also infra 
Part I.A.1 (discussing blocking patents); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual 
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each author to maintain the rights to her respective contributions but would require 
the authors to negotiate with one another to avoid infringement claims for use of 
one another’s copyrighted content, or to compensate one another for the use of that 
content.20 
Courts, however, have been slow to accept the doctrine, and it has largely been 
neglected.21  As a result, because the potential liability for derivative authors who 
lack approval to use an underlying work is significant,22 the possible source 
material for derivative works is effectively constrained to works for which 
permission can be obtained and works that are already in the public domain.23  Not 
only is this an extremely limited universe of raw material upon which to draw, but 
it also may be less relevant to the public.24 
This Article argues that the doctrine of blocking copyrights should be revisited, 
finding in the caselaw support and growing momentum that creates new 
opportunities for courts to employ principles of blocking copyrights, if not 
wholesale adoption of the doctrine.25  The Article suggests a method for courts to 
incorporate concepts of blocking copyrights by means of the remedies granted in 
lawsuits alleging infringement of the right to prepare derivative works.  In doing so, 
the Article draws upon the well-developed body of law dealing with improvements 
to tangible property.  Although copyright law’s moorings in the public interest 
present a key difference from the torts and real property realms, courts can account 
for that difference in a principled way, as proposed in this Article, to effectively 
implement blocking copyrights. 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I describes the blocking patents and 
blocking copyrights doctrines, respectively.  It also sets out rules of tort and real 
property law that are favorable to improvers as a contrast to copyright law’s harsh 
treatment of derivative authors.  Part II analyzes the statutory and jurisprudential 
treatment of derivative works, concluding that derivative authors are entitled under 
 
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2659 n.15 (1994) (noting that a doctrine of blocking copyrights 
would avoid problems of copyright holders receiving far greater returns than needed to induce 
investment in their initial works, and derivative authors receiving far less returns than needed to justify 
investment in derivative works). 
 20. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing blocking copyrights). 
 21. See, e.g., Herbert Hovencamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1737 (2003) (“[T]here is no law of ‘blocking copyrights.’”); Merges, 
supra note 19, at 2659 n.15 (noting “lack of a doctrine of ‘blocking copyrights’”); see also infra Part II 
(discussing cases). 
 22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (providing that successful plaintiff may be entitled to 
the defendant’s profits and statutory damages of up to $150,000 per work willfully infringed without 
proof of harm); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Essay, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 
1483, 1486 (2007) (“[P]laintiffs in copyright cases can readily obtain . . . monetary awards in excess of 
their harm.”). 
 23. ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  THE LAW OF 
COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 67 (2003) (“A ‘second generation’ work only obtains 
copyright protection as a derivative work if the later work was used with permission of the copyright 
holder, or if the later work was part of the public domain.”). 
 24. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing time-sensitive nature of derivative 
works). 
 25. See infra Parts II & III.A (discussing cases). 
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the Copyright Act to retain rights to their separable, original contributions—even in 
unauthorized derivative works—and refuting caselaw that holds otherwise.  Part III 
describes copyright remedies and explains how courts, by drawing upon tort and 
property law, can modify the remedies granted to effectively incorporate principles 
of blocking copyrights for unauthorized derivative works.  Part III concludes by 
identifying, and responding to, possible objections to the more permissive approach 
to unauthorized derivative works proposed herein. 
I.  THE LAW’S TREATMENT OF IMPROVERS OF INTANGIBLE AND 
TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
The plight of improvers is not unique to copyright law.  Other areas of the law, 
both those dealing with intellectual property and those dealing with tangible 
property, offer useful analogues. 
A.  DOGS IN THE IP MANGER 
The concept of blocking copyrights derives from a related situation in patent 
law.  Indeed, other forms of intellectual property face the same or similar 
challenges as those encountered by derivative works in copyright law.  For 
example, the grant of a patent to one party may impede later research by others or 
preempt an entire field of study.26  Useful commercial products in some areas of 
technology may be stalled by “patent thickets,” where the developer of an 
innovative product faces holdout behavior based on a multitude—often hundreds—
of patents that require clearance before that product can be brought to market.27 
The law accordingly needs safeguards to temper the potential anticompetitive 
effects of intellectual property protection.  Trademark law, for example, is perhaps 
the least tolerant of “dog-in-the-manger” behavior.  Actual use, or a bona fide 
intent to use followed by actual use, of a mark in commerce is a prerequisite for 
federal trademark registration.28  For unregistered marks, a plaintiff’s rights are 
 
 26. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-700 (1998); Heidi L. Williams, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation:  Evidence from the Human Genome 12-15 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16213, 2010) (noting the persistent negative effects on subsequent 
scientific research in the context of gene patents). 
 27. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities:  An Open Licensing 
Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1039 (2005) (describing patent 
thickets in pharmaceutical industry); J. Peter Paredes, Written Description Requirement in 
Nanotechnology:  Clearing a Patent Thicket?, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 489, 492-93 
(2006) (discussing patent thickets in nanotechnology); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:  
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 
119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001) (defining patent thicket as “an overlapping 
set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from 
multiple patentees”). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “[t]he owner of a trademark used in commerce 
may request registration of its trademark”); id. § 1051(b)(1) (providing that “[a] person who has a bona 
fide intention . . . to use a trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark”); id. 
§ 1051(d)(1)-(2) (requiring verified statement that trademark is being used in commerce within specified 
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limited based on the geographic areas in which she has made continuous use of the 
mark.29  Moreover, priority disputes for rights based on either registration or 
common law are resolved under trademark law based on which party was making 
good faith use of the mark first.30  As an additional example of tools designed to 
cultivate continued progress in intellectual property, patent law includes an 
experimental use exemption from infringement when a defendant uses an invention 
for the purpose of experimenting or improving on the invention.31  Courts have also 
used the statutory subject matter requirement to invalidate patents or deny patent 
applications that stifle future research and development.32 
1.  Blocking Patents 
Patent law presents another sophisticated tool for balancing the interests of the 
creator of an initial work and one who builds upon it that is particularly relevant to 
derivative works in copyright law—the blocking patents doctrine.  This doctrine 
can be illustrated by a scenario involving a new invention that consists of the 
combination of (1) an already patented, preexisting “base” invention, and (2) an 
improvement on that base invention.33  For example, in a hypothetical pre-furniture 
world, a rocking chair would be a follow-on invention based on the conventional 
four-legged chair.34 
 
time limits following grant of trademark registration). 
Some trade secret laws also require continuous use, albeit in a slightly different sense.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939) (noting that trade secrets are not single or one time 
pieces of information; instead, “[a] trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation 
of the business.”); see also Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(holding that the Restatement definition excludes “single or ephemeral events in the conduct of [a] 
business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain 
employees”). 
 29. See, e.g., Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523-26 (C.C.P.A. 1980) 
(holding that the nonregistering party was limited to the area of actual use of the mark and could not 
assert rights beyond its existing territory and a restricted “zone of expansion”). 
 30. See, e.g., Blue Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1975) (awarding 
priority to the party that proved earliest good faith use of mark in commerce). 
 31. Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:  Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to 
Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17-32 (2001) (describing 
historical development of common law experimental use exemption from patent infringement). 
 32. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) 
(holding patents-in-suit invalid for lack of proper subject matter because the patents “would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of 
further discoveries”). 
 33. For a case involving blocking patents, see International Manufacturing Co. v. Landon, Inc., 
336 F.2d 723, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1964).  “Improvement” and “improver” in the blocking patents context, 
and in the context of this Article, do not denote any qualitative or quantitative judgment but instead 
focus more generally on progress or growth in the discipline at issue by building on prior works.  Any 
follow-on creator would be considered to be an “improver.” 
 34. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 16-17 (3d ed. 2009) (describing patents on chair and 
rocking chair, respectively, as blocking patents to one another); see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 881-94 (1990) (providing 
examples of cumulative innovation in the development of airplanes, automobiles, and semiconductors, 
among other technologies). 
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Under the blocking patents doctrine, even though the improver may not have 
had authorization to use the base invention, she is entitled to a patent protecting her 
contribution to the new invention.35  The improvement patentee cannot practice the 
new invention without infringing the underlying patent on the base invention.36  At 
the same time, however, the patentee of the base invention cannot use the 
improvement without infringing the improver’s patent.37  Thus, the two patents 
“block” each other, and neither party obtains the benefit of the improvement while 
the base patent is still in force.  Allowing the improver to obtain a patent on her 
contribution at least gives her bargaining power and an opportunity to reach an 
agreement with the owner of the base invention.  If an agreement is advantageous 
to both parties, logic predicts that they will reach one.38  This doctrine reflects the 
reality that progress often comes from discrete, incremental changes that stem from 
preexisting inventions, rather than from a monumental breakthrough.39 
2.  Blocking Copyrights 
Among the various forms of legal protection for intellectual property, only the 
copyright and patent laws share the constitutional pedigree of “Promot[ing] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”40  Both bodies of law do so for the public 
good and in the same general manner, by conferring exclusive rights on 
individuals.41  Many similarities between these rights exist, and copyright and 
patent laws accordingly often serve as useful comparators for one another, each 
informing the course of the other’s development.42  As with patent law, the 
 
 35. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.03 at 1-10 n.35, § 16.02, at 16-14, 
16-16 (2d ed. 1980).  This assumes that the improvement meets the independent criteria for 
patentability, particularly the requirement that the invention be nonobvious over the prior art.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2011) (“A patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been 
obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (setting out standard for patent infringement). 
 37. ROSENBERG, supra note 35, at § 16.02, at 16-14, 16-16. 
 38. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:  The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994) (noting common sense assumption that parties will 
reach a mutually beneficial agreement).  Merges also explains, however, that logic will occasionally fail 
and that such a failure warrants judicial intervention.  Id.  Patent law’s reverse doctrine of equivalents is 
a sound response to an impasse like this.  Id.  The reverse doctrine of equivalents operates to excuse 
from liability an infringer whose invention, while falling literally within the claims of the patent, has so 
extensively changed the principle of the device claimed by the patent that he has done nothing in 
conflict with the “spirit and intent” of the original patent.  See Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. 
Westinghouse, 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898) (describing the reverse doctrine of equivalents). 
 39. Indeed, patent law appropriately did away with any such romanticized notion of invention 
over half a century ago.  See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 
103, as enacted in the 1952 Patent Act, abolished the purported “flash of creative genius” test for 
patentability); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 2011) (“Patentability shall not be negated by the 
manner in which the invention was made.”). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41. Id.; see also infra notes 166-171 (describing constitutional mandate and its emphasis on 
public welfare). 
 42. Courts and commentators have drawn the analogy between patent law and copyright law.  
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cumulative nature of progress in copyright law often makes derivative works 
particularly valuable and relevant.43 
A blocking copyrights doctrine would function similarly to that described for 
patents.  Significantly, the doctrine would allow authors greater freedom to 
improve on preexisting works because they would not automatically be barred from 
creating unauthorized derivative works.  Additionally, a blocking copyrights 
regime would grant an author who bases a new creation on an already copyrighted 
work to obtain protection for the original expression she contributes to arrive at the 
derivative work.  All of the author’s rights in the preexisting work would remain 
intact, but the derivative creator’s original expression would likewise obtain 
protection. 
This system would essentially lead to the creation of successive tiers of valid 
copyrights that block one another.  For example, an original oil painting, which 
would have “first tier” copyright status, could be the basis for a fabric print that 
recognizably incorporates elements of the painting, but also adds original, new 
effects.  The fabric print would be a derivative work, occupying the “second tier” of 
copyright protection.44  Although the fabric print would infringe upon the painting, 
the original material it added would be entitled to copyright protection.  Copyright 
protection in the fabric would attach only to the new elements added by the maker 
of the fabric.45  Later, the fabric print might become the source of a tile design, 
which would occupy the “third tier” in this hierarchy.  The maker of the tile would 
be infringing the copyrights in both the painting and the fabric.  As a corollary of 
 
See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006) (analogizing rights of 
copyright law to patent law to resolve issue of appropriate injunctive relief); Sony Corp. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19 (1984) (noting “historic kinship between patent law and 
copyright law” and that the Court has “recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and 
patents”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.”’); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 
1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has “equated the public policies of copyright and patent”); Tal 
Kedem, Secondary Liability for Actively Inducing Patent Infringement:  Which Intentions Pave the 
Road?, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1484 (2007) (noting Supreme Court’s acknowledgement of 
“long history of borrowing of doctrinal principles between the patent law and the copyright law”); 
Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” and Why Universities 
Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR. L. REV. 779, 779 (2005) (noting that “[t]he laws governing patent and 
copyright are closely related and frequently intertwine” and arguing that copyright law’s fair use 
doctrine should be incorporated into patent law); Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain:  
Competing Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 360 
(2010) (noting “similarity in the goals of copyright and patent law” and “the underlying objectives of 
copyright and patent” of “promoting creative accomplishment”). 
 43. Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process:  Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2005 (2011) (“Research indicates . . . that 
people tend to appreciate artistic creativity most when it presents something new, but not too different 
from preexisting work.”). 
 44. This assumes that the makers of the wallpaper modified the preexisting painting in some way 
so as to meet the originality requirement of the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright 
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship . . . .”). 
 45. See infra Part II (discussing statutory provisions governing derivative works). 
37.1 MULLALLY ARTICLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  12:51 PM 
2013] BLOCKING COPYRIGHTS REVISITED 67 
this, if the painter who created the initial work incorporates elements from the tile 
design into a subsequent painting, she would be liable to both the maker of the 
fabric and the maker of the tile for their respective contributions.  Each author 
would be able to recover against one another or third parties for infringing upon her 
respective copyrighted material.  Creative works often contain numerous distinct 
copyrightable elements,46 and the scope of the resultant copyright protection 
ultimately afforded to each derivative work would be determined by severing the 
original, non-infringing portions of each derivative author’s work from the 
underlying work (or works)47 and ensuring that the material added by the derivative 
author is in a fixed form and meets the standard for originality.48 
In addition to achieving copyright’s constitutionally mandated goal of furthering 
progress of creative arts, a blocking copyrights doctrine is particularly warranted in 
light of the ethics of improvement in copyright law, demonstrated by the historical 
and philosophical underpinnings of United States copyright law.  For decades, the 
American copyright system was hostile to foreign authors, offering little, if any, 
protection for works made outside the United States.49  Critics of early U.S. 
copyright law decried it as “permitt[ing] and even encourag[ing] legalized piracy of 
foreign authors by American publishers.”50  Supposed concessions in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did little to change the law’s bias.51 
 
 46. See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that, when 
analyzing copyright infringement of literary works, courts consider the respective works’ “plot, themes, 
dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events”); Erickson v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 
1132, 1139 (D. Or. 2012) (noting that copyrightable elements of music “may include melody, harmony, 
rhythm, pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, chord progressions, ‘hooks,’ instrumental figures, and overall 
song structure.”); Splitfish AG v. Bannco Corp., 727 F. Supp. 2d 461, 467 (E.D. Va. 2010) (noting 
presence of functional and nonfunctional elements of computer software); TMTV, Corp. v. Mass Prods. 
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 196, 203-04 (D.P.R. 2004) (noting distinctive “thematic, plot, characters, character 
interacting, setting, decorative, costume, musical, pace, lighting, scenographic and other multiple 
expressive elements” as copyrightable aspects of television show). 
 47. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (regarding scope of derivative copyright); Russell v. Price, 612 
F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[A] derivative copyright protects . . . the new material contained in the 
derivative work, not the matter derived from the underlying work.”); see also Eden Toys, Inc. v. 
Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 35 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining successive tiers of copyright 
protection for authorized derivative work). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (setting forth requirements of originality and fixation for copyright 
protection); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1509-10 
(2009) (noting copyright law’s two threshold requirements for protection and that “[b]oth requirements 
set a very low threshold for obtaining protection, even in combination”). 
 49. Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute:  Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 
56 UCLA L. Rev. 1775, 1783 n.35 (2009) (“For example, the first U.S. copyright statute conferred 
protection only on ‘citizens of these United States, or residents therein,’ and expressly provided that 
‘nothing in this act shall be construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or 
publishing within the United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by 
any person not a citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the 
United States.’” (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (repealed 1831))). 
 50. Id. at 1780 (recounting complaints of author Ezra Pound). 
 51. See id. at 1779-80 (“[P]rotectionist features of U.S. copyright law . . . for more than a century 
had favored the interests of American printers and book manufacturers at the expense of foreign authors’ 
rights.  Even though Congress amended the law in 1891 and again in 1909 to give foreign authors a 
better chance of obtaining copyright protection in the United States, the technical requirements were 
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One key effect of these domestically biased copyright laws was the emergence 
and rapid growth of a rich cultural environment in the United States.52  To varying 
extents, all creative works build on, and benefit from, preceding innovations,53 and 
the ready availability of vast source material as not only abstract inspiration but 
also as a specific foundation for other works allowed American authors and 
creators to flourish.54  Modern sectors of creativity and entertainment have 
similarly benefited from the use of preexisting works.55  For example, the film 
industry relies heavily on adaptations of other works for contemporary 
productions.56  As Lawrence Lessig has demonstrated, many of these uses of 
preexisting works have been unauthorized and have allowed large-scale content 
providers to grow their respective industries.57 
Compared to patent law, the case for a blocking doctrine is equally, if not more, 
compelling in copyright law.  Derivative authors may face more commercially 
irrational reactions and disincentives to licensing by the owner of a copyrighted 
work than an inventor trying to improve on a patented product.58  In addition, 
copyright law’s significantly longer term of protection inhibits to a greater extent 
the creation of follow-on works.59  Indeed, the term of protection might effectively 
 
onerous and many authors could not comply with them.”). 
 52. See Thomas Bender & David Sampliner, Poets, Pirates, and the Creation of American 
Literature, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 255, 255 (1996-97) (“The first century of copyright law in the 
United States provides a striking illustration of how an outlaw nation built its cultural industries and 
developed many of its cultural treasures while largely disregarding the intellectual property rights of 
foreign writers.”); Robert J. Gutowski, Comment, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and 
International Trade in The TRIPs Agreement:  Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47 
BUFF L. REV. 713, 749-50 (1999) (discussing how the human rights view of intellectual property 
imposed by western culture on developing nations is actually contrary to the norms used by the west in 
their own legal history and noting that “the condoned piracy of foreign-published books ‘indirectly 
fostered the growth of the American publishing industry’” (quoting BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND 
COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 16 (1997)). 
 53. See supra note 14 (describing how authors build on preexisting works). 
 54. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 52 (2003) (noting that absence of copyright protection “reduces the cost 
of writing by enabling an author to copy freely from his predecessors”). 
 55. See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 49, at 1815 (citing examples and noting “the freedom to create 
adaptations of, and to borrow extensively from, others’ works is a defining feature of modernist 
writing”). 
 56. See Jason Dietz, Are Original Movies Really Better than Derivative Works?, METACRITIC 
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.metacritic.com/feature/movie-sequels-remakes-and-adaptations (conducting 
a study and concluding that the majority of films released between 2006 and 2010 were sequels, 
remakes, and adaptations). 
 57. Lessig explains, “If ‘piracy’ means using the creative property of others without their 
permission . . . then the history of the content industry is a history of piracy.  Every important sector of 
‘big media’ today—film, records, radio, and cable TV—was born of a kind of piracy so defined.”  
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 53 (2004).  Lessig goes on to demonstrate the prevalence 
of “piracy” in each of these industries.  Id. at 53-61. 
 58. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell:  Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright 
Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 84 (1991) (noting that “authors often form emotional attachments to their 
works which are nonpecuniary in nature”). 
 59. The term of protection afforded by a patent is twenty years from the earliest effective U.S. 
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result in the complete suppression of otherwise worthwhile derivative works, 
because the preexisting work may no longer be relevant or may have greatly 
diminished value to the public in seventy or more years.60  
B.  UNAUTHORIZED IMPROVERS OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
Remedies in the Copyright Act are not dependent on the type of work that is 
infringing or the particular right that is infringed.61  In contrast, tort and property 
law have developed more tailored rules to deal specifically with improvements to 
tangible property.  As discussed below, these rules are useful in considering the 
appropriate scope of protection for unauthorized derivative works.  Nevertheless, 
this Article does not advocate wholesale importation of property or tort law into 
copyright law.  To be sure, information and ideas do not have the same attributes as 
physical property, and these dissimilarities mandate different treatment by the 
law.62  At the same time, tort and property law have been useful in informing 
copyright jurisprudence and scholarship.  Scholars have looked to concepts from 
real property in discussing copyright63 and other intellectual property issues.64  Tort 
law has also shed light on copyright law,65 and it is a logical resource given its 
familiarity with valuation of reputational harms—a particular concern with 
derivative works.66  Further, particularly relevant to this Article’s discussion of 
 
filing date of the application, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012), whereas the term of protection afforded by a 
copyright is the life of the author plus seventy years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 60. See Mandel, supra note 43, at 2005 (noting the value of creative works that build 
incrementally on works that are known by and familiar to the public); cf. Merges & Nelson, supra note 
34, at 878 (“[W]hen it comes to invention and innovation, faster is better.”). 
 61. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–13 (2012) (setting out copyright remedies); id. § 106 (setting out 
copyright holders’ rights). 
 62. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108, 110 (1990) (“Ordinary property is occupied and wears out to boot.  Intellectual property can 
be used by many at once, without being used up.  The marginal cost of its use is zero . . . .”); Richard A. 
Epstein, Intellectual Property:  Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 804 (2001) (noting 
limitations in applying real property law to intellectual property). 
 63. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1527 (noting that accession doctrine is a 
property law analogue to the “doctrine of inequivalents” mechanism in authors’ system of calibrating the 
scope of a copyrighted work’s protection to its level of originality).  Although it has not yet been 
developed in relation to derivative works, the doctrine of waste from real property law might also be 
fruitful in shedding light on the problem of underutilization and refusals to deal with respect to 
derivative works.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste 
in American Property Law, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1055 (2011). 
 64. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patents Are Property:  A Fundamental but Important 
Concept, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 87, 88-89 (2009) (arguing that patent owners should be able to protect 
their rights just as the owners of tangible property would be able to, i.e., “without regard to whether the 
patent owner is injured by the infringement”); Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement 
Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 175, 202-18 (2011) (applying accession doctrine from real property law to 
improvements in patent law). 
 65. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1354-94 (1989) (comparing the 
entitlements structure of copyright law to tort law and property law). 
 66. See infra Part III.D; see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970) (noting 
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remedies in copyright law,67 courts have looked to tort law to guide their approach 
to copyright damages.68  Thus, rather than ignore the developed body of law 
dealing with tangible property entirely, this Article seeks to incorporate useful 
aspects of the law specific to improvers and only with respect to the discrete 
category of derivative works, not copyright law as a whole.  The Article recognizes 
a key difference between the tort and real property systems on the one hand, and 
the copyright system on the other hand, and uses that difference to modify the 
application of doctrines developed for tangible property in the copyright context.69 
The key aspect of tort and property law relevant to derivative works is that those 
bodies of jurisprudence include statutory and judicial rules that treat unauthorized 
improvers of real and personal property more favorably than improvers are treated 
under copyright law.  Many jurisdictions have, for instance, enacted statutes, or 
invoked principles of equity, to protect the investment of a party who improves 
tangible property that is not her own.70  Historically, these rules were intended to 
encourage improvements and the development of settled lands and to ameliorate 
the law’s previously harsh treatment of trespassing improvers.71  Courts granting 
relief to an improver generally allow the improver to retain rights to the 
improvements, subject to the payment of damages for the affixing and removal of 
the improvements.72  Other forms of relief have included permitting an offset 
 
possibility of using tort law to protect any dignitary rights authors might have). 
 67. See infra Part III. 
 68. HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 17:2 (“[T]he case law is in accord with the 
normal meaning that would be expected for damages for any tort:  monetary compensation for the harm 
done to the copyright owner by the infringement.” (citing JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
BUSINESS AND PRACTICE § 9:17 (2d ed.))); id. (“This uncertainty over the amount of damages is not 
unique to copyright law and the courts have readily adapted the traditional tort law distinction between 
certainty of the fact of damage and certainty as to the amount of damage.”). 
 69. See infra Part III.B. 
 70. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.3(b) (West 2013) (allowing recovery for good faith 
improvers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1004 (2012) (same); James v. Bailey, 370 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D.V.I. 
1974) (noting that the harshness of the common law rule requiring one who improved land to do so at 
her own risk “has been substantially relieved either by statute or by equity”); Raab v. Casper, 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 590 (Ct. App. 1975) (interpreting California’s good faith improver statute); Golden Press, Inc. v. 
Rylands, 235 P.2d 592, 596 (Colo. 1951) (en banc) (refusing to grant an injunction when defendant built 
the foundation of a building on plaintiff’s land, noting that “[t]he expense and hardship of such removal 
would be so great in comparison with any advantage of plaintiffs to be gained thereby that we think it 
would be unconscionable to require it”); Restatement (First) of Restitution § 42 cmt. c (1937) 
(governing improvements upon land or chattels); 41 AM. JUR. 2D, Improvements § 5 (2005) 
(summarizing statutory and common law requirements on bona fide possessors to compensate 
improvers); Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42-49 (1985) 
(discussing relief for encroachment). 
 71. John Henry Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing Improver, 11 STAN. L. REV. 
456, 466-67 (1959) (describing history of legislation and judge-made law designed to stimulate the 
settlement and improvement of lands and to treat trespassing improvers less harshly). 
 72. See, e.g., Tremper v. Quinones, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 672, 673, 675 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004) 
(allowing improver to remove improvements but requiring payment to the owner of the land for any 
damages caused by the creation and removal of the improvements); Bank of America v. J. & S. Auto 
Repairs, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (1985) (allowing improver to remove parts installed in a van as long as it did 
not do damage to the van); Merryman, supra note 71, at 479 (noting limits to statutory right to remove 
improvements in early betterment statutes). 
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against rents otherwise due by an improver and requiring the owner of the property 
that was improved to pay the improver for the value of the improvements.73  
Significantly, these decisions are not limited to bona fide purchasers without notice 
of title.74 
As another example, one branch of common law dealing with trespassory 
invasions to land or personal property allows for an exception, one favorable to 
improvers, to the rule of accession.  Under accession, a possessor of land may 
automatically take ownership of unauthorized improvements made to that 
property.75  To achieve a more equitable result, however, courts have, within the 
accession doctrine, granted relief to improvers, holding that if an improver acts in 
good faith and substantially transforms underlying raw materials, title to the 
improved property belongs to the improver as long as she compensates the owner 
for the value of the starting materials.76  As Blackstone explained,  
if the thing itself, by such operation, was changed into a different species, as by 
making wine, oil, or bread, out of another’s grapes, olives, or wheat, it belongs to the 
new operator[,] who has only to make a satisfaction to the former proprietor for the 
materials, which he had so converted.77 
Among other contexts in which this exception has been applied, courts have 
granted relief to the improver where an improver mixes her labor with the physical 
property of another, as well as where an improver creates something new made of 
 
 73. See, e.g., In re Fowler, 425 B.R. 157, 206 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (compelling owner of 
property that was improved to pay for the improvements to the extent that improvements enhanced the 
value of the land); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Wyandotte Cnty. v. Adkins, 749 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Kan. 
App. 1988) (holding that good faith improvers may be compensated for improvements); Roesch v. 
Wachter, 618 P.2d 448, 451 (Or. App. 1980) (allowing defendant a credit against rent). 
 74. See, e.g., Tremper, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 674-75 (allowing defendant to remove improvements 
from plaintiff’s property even though defendant continued improvements after learning of property’s 
correct boundary line); Manning v. Wingo, 577 So. 2d 865, 868 (Ala. 1991) (holding that purchasers of 
property from beneficiary, although they had constructive notice that beneficiary did not own the 
property, were entitled to recover the value of the improvements they made to the property); Larry C. 
Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma, 639 P.2d 47, 61 (Mont. 1981) (allowing appellant improvers to recover even 
though “[t]here is little doubt that appellants knew the contract they entered into was suspect . . . 
[because t]o deprive appellants the fruits of their labor . . . would not be in the best interests of justice, 
fair play, and public policy”). 
 75. See, e.g., Blackwood Tire & Vulcanizing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 182 S.W. 576, 576 (Tenn. 
1916) (“The general rule of the common law in regard to title by accession is that, whatever alteration of 
form has taken place in personal property, the owner is entitled to such property in its state of 
improvement . . . .” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 76. See, e.g., Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich. 311, 315 (1871) (granting relief to improver and 
observing that there must “be some limit to the [property owner’s] right to follow and reclaim materials 
which have undergone a process of manufacture”). 
 77. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *404.  Similarly, Justice Story has written, 
Take the case of a vacant lot in a city, where a bona fide purchaser builds a house thereon, 
enhancing the value of the estate to ten times the original value of the land . . . is it reasonable 
and just, that in such a case, the true owner should recover and possess the whole, without any 
compensation whatever to the bona fide purchaser?  To me it seems manifestly unjust and 
inequitable . . . . 
Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127, 133 (C.C. D. Me. 1841) (No. 1, 875). 
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her own personal property and another’s personal property, where the two 
contributions are joined but remain distinguishable78—a result particularly relevant 
to derivative works.79  Moreover, the exception has been applied even when the 
improver acted willfully.80 
These doctrines based on tangible property are all mechanisms to achieve a fair 
apportionment of rights and compensation between two parties, when both have a 
claim to property comprised of a starting material and a contribution to it.  Factors 
courts have considered in granting relief to an improver include the separability of 
the parties’ respective contributions,81 the good faith of the improver, the increase 
in value resulting from the improvements, the extent of the change made to the 
underlying work82 and the conduct or bad faith of the owner of the preexisting 
property.83 
Copyright law should incorporate aspects of these improvement doctrines 
relating to tangible property into the law regarding derivative works.  
Considerations of the value of the improvements and good faith that exist in tort 
and property law may, for instance, be used to guide courts’ resolutions of 
infringements by unauthorized derivative works.  Indeed, there is a meaningful 
distinction between a defendant who commits infringement by simple piracy of a 
preexisting work and a defendant who uses that same preexisting work to create 
something significantly different.  In the latter case, the interest of copyright law in 
promoting the creation of works of art no longer lies exclusively with the holder of 
 
 78. Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 111, 
118-20 (1922). 
 79. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing partitioning of derivative and preexisting works). 
 80. Arnold, supra note 78, at 105, 108 (noting that courts have allowed recovery in some cases 
even where taking was willful); see also Merryman, supra note 71, at 494 (arguing that judges should 
have discretion to provide relief to even intentional trespassers who improve real property). 
 81. See, e.g., Omaha Standard, Inc. v. Nissen, 187 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Iowa 1971) (“[C]ourts are 
less likely to apply the doctrine of accession if the items in question can be removed expediently and 
with little or no damage to themselves or [the property to which they are attached]” (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted).); Wetherbee, 22 Mich. at 320 (“When the right to the improved article is 
the point in issue, the question, how much the property or labor of each has contributed to make it what 
it is, must always be of first importance.”); Bancorp Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Stadeli Pump & Const., 
Inc., 739 P.2d 548, 553 (Or. 1987) (concluding that an engine added to a truck by defendant did not 
accede to the plaintiff, reasoning that the engine and truck were easily severable); Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 
4, 7 (1872) (holding that an improver of a wagon had a claim for conversion against the owner of the 
wagon where the improvements “could be followed, identified, severed without detriment to the wagon, 
and appropriated to the other use without loss.  The [improver] . . . was the owner, and never parted with 
the property.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Baker v. Mersch, 45 N.W. 685, 688 (Neb. 1890) (“Where the appropriation of the 
property of another is accidental, as though mistake of fact, and labor has in good faith been expended 
upon it which converts it into something entirely different, and very greatly increases its value, the 
original article being comparatively of but little value, the title to the property will be held to pass to the 
person by whose labor the change has been wrought, and the original owner may recover the value of 
the article as it was before its conversion.”). 
 83. James v. Bailey, 370 F. Supp. 469, 471 (D.V.I. 1974) (“One group of cases in which most 
courts, and the Restatement [of Restitution], would allow the improver to maintain an independent 
action to recover the value of his improvement is that in which the owner has been guilty of some 
inequitable conduct.”). 
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the copyright in the initial work.  Nevertheless, courts have often treated improvers 
of creative works harshly and have not yet accepted a blocking copyrights 
doctrine.84 
II.  TENSIONS IN STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF RIGHTS IN UNAUTHORIZED DERIVATIVE 
WORKS 
The lack of an established blocking copyrights doctrine is likely due at least in 
part to ambiguities in the statutory provisions governing derivative works.  The 
Copyright Act defines a derivative work expansively as “a work based upon one or 
more preexisting works.”85  The definition is “hopelessly overbroad . . . for ‘[e]very 
book in literature, science and art, borrows and must necessarily borrow, and use 
much which was well known and used before.’”86  Indeed, under a literal reading of 
the statute, every work would be a derivative work, as all works build on and are 
influenced by prior creation in some way.87  Some courts have tried to elaborate on 
the statutory definition by defining a derivative work based on its relationship to 
the preexisting work:  “[A] work will be considered a derivative work only if it 
would be considered an infringing work if the material which it has derived from a 
prior work had been taken without the consent of the copyright proprietor of such 
prior work.”88  This definition, however, essentially conflates the right to prepare 
derivative works with the right to reproduce the work, leading to confusion and 
causing scholars to question whether the right to prepare derivative works is 
superfluous.89 
Even accepting a workable definition of derivative works, at least with respect 
to the specific examples identified in the statute, the provisions that subsequently 
govern derivative works present further interpretative difficulties.90  Congress 
addressed the copyrightability and scope of protection for derivative works in the 
two subsections of 17 U.S.C. § 103, entitled “Subject Matter of Copyright:  
Compilations and Derivative Works.”91  Subsection (a) provides, “[t]he subject 
 
 84. See infra Part II (discussing statutes and caselaw). 
 85. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (setting out definition of derivative works). 
 86. Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Emerson v. 
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)); see also Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking 
Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1233-39 (1997) (noting expansive definition of derivative 
works). 
 87. See supra note 14 (noting cumulative nature of creativity). 
 88. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting U.S. v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 
961, 965 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
 89. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1017 (“It is not clear precisely how a derivative work differs from a 
nonliteral copy, or what section 106(2) adds to the provisions of 106(1).”). 
 90. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (listing examples given in statute). 
 91. The provision in its entirety reads as follows: 
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and 
derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright 
subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used 
unlawfully. 
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matter of copyright . . . includes compilations and derivative works, but protection 
for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not 
extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”92  
Section 103(a) thus establishes that the subject matter of copyright encompasses 
derivative works, but sets a limit on how far that copyright extends.  Subsection (b) 
then continues to set limits on the scope of protection based on separating the 
preexisting material from the new material in a particular work, stating that “[t]he 
copyright in . . . a derivative work extends only to material contributed by the 
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the 
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.”93  The 
subsection concludes with an additional limit with respect to the copyright in the 
preexisting work:  “The copyright in such [derivative] work is independent of, and 
does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any 
copyright protection in the preexisting material.”94 
Although these provisions speak to the capacity for, and extent of, protection for 
derivative works, neither expressly addresses whether a creator who lacks 
permission to use a preexisting copyrighted work in preparing a derivative work 
may obtain a copyright on the original material she contributed in creating that 
derivative work.  Thus, an issue arises regarding the respective rights of an 
unauthorized derivative author and the author of the preexisting work on which that 
derivative work is based, as described in the introductory scenario with the short 
story author and playwright.95 
Two possible outcomes for that situation exist:  (1) creators such as the 
playwright may make unauthorized derivative works, and both the author of the 
preexisting work and the author of the derivative work own the copyrights to their 
respective contributions; or (2) authors of preexisting works, such as the writer of 
the short story, can enjoin the derivative author, and the derivative author has no 
copyright protection in even her original contributions contained in an unauthorized 
derivative work.96  The first outcome represents application of the blocking 
copyrights doctrine.  Under this approach, each author can recover against the other 
or against third parties for infringing upon her respective copyrighted material.  
 
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by 
the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, 
and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.  The copyright in such work is 
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, 
any copyright protection in the preexisting material. 
17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 92. Id. § 103(a). 
 93. Id. § 103(b). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra Introduction. 
 96. A third possible outcome is that the derivative author’s contributions to the derivative work 
simply fall into the public domain.  Because the most logical use of the derivative author’s contributions 
is as part of the derivative work, however, and this outcome is simply a variation on the denial of rights 
to unauthorized derivative authors (the first outcome), it will not be discussed separately.  See Lemley, 
supra note 19, at 1022 (noting that the derivative author’s contributions are only nominally in the public 
domain because the author of preexisting work in reality appropriates the derivative work’s value). 
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With the second outcome, the author of the preexisting work effectively 
appropriates the right to the derivative author’s contributions because any person 
copying the derivative work would, like the derivative author, be liable for 
infringing the copyright on the preexisting work.97  The author of the preexisting 
work can therefore either prohibit the exploitation of the derivative work by 
obtaining an injunction against the use of the preexisting material, or license its use 
and collect profits, capturing the value of the derivative author’s contributions.98 
The difficulty with the statutory language is that arguments for both outcomes 
can be made based on § 103.  First, in favor of blocking copyrights, subsection (a) 
states plainly that the subject matter of copyright includes derivative works, 
without limiting the rights extended therein to only authorized or licensed uses of 
the preexisting work.  The provision simply notes that protection “does not extend 
to any parts of the [derivative] work in which such [preexisting] material has been 
used unlawfully,” affirming that protection does extend to other parts of the 
derivative work, i.e., those in which preexisting material has not been used 
unlawfully.99  Congress thus contemplated that unauthorized derivative works 
would be made, included them in the statute, and directly addressed them as 
deemed necessary.100  Further, subsection (b) states that copyright protection 
“extends only to the material contributed by the author of such [derivative] work, 
as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work,” further 
supporting the division of copyright protection embodied in the blocking 
copyrights doctrine.101  In other words, Congress broadly extended copyright 
protection to all derivative works, but qualified the rights for certain parts of certain 
kinds of derivative works, namely those in which the preexisting material has been 
used unlawfully; the protection for those works simply does not extend to “the 
preexisting material employed in the work.”102 
 
 97. Describing this view, one scholar has noted: 
Only the original author or a licensee is entitled to a copyright in the derivative work.  This 
means that if an infringer makes a movie out of a copyrighted book, adding substantial 
expression of her own in the process, she is not entitled to a copyright in any portion of the 
movie in which infringing material appears. 
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 564 (5th ed. 
2010); see also Lemley, supra note 19, at 1021 (“[S]ection 103 . . . provides that original works of 
authorship contributed as part of the creation of a derivative work are copyrightable only by the original 
copyright owners or their licensee.”); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 23, at 67 (“[F]or a valid 
copyright in a derivative work to exist, the derivative work author must either base his work upon a 
public domain source, or obtain permission from the owner of the copyright of the underlying work on 
which it is based.”). 
 98. See Lemley, supra note 19, at 1021 (noting that the author of a preexisting work has “power 
of capture” over the derivative work). 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (emphasis added). 
 100. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976) (stating that “[t]he second part of the sentence that 
makes up section 103(a) deals with the status of a compilation or derivative work unlawfully employing 
preexisting copyrighted material”); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 3.06 (2012) (noting that the issue of unauthorized derivative works is “explicitly treated 
under the Act”). 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). 
 102. Id. 
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The legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended to provide 
protection for the new, original (non-infringing) material in derivative works that 
unlawfully incorporate some preexisting material.  The House Report 
accompanying § 103 states: 
The second part of the sentence that makes up section 103(a) deals with the status of a 
compilation or derivative work unlawfully employing preexisting material.  In 
providing that protection does not extend to ‘any part of the work in which such 
material has been used unlawfully,’ the bill prevents an infringer from benefiting, 
through copyright protection, from committing an unlawful act, but preserves 
protection for those parts of the work that do not employ the preexisting work.103 
Thus, the House Report explains that original features contributed by the creator of 
a derivative work are entitled to copyright protection.104  More specifically, the 
unqualified language of both the statute and the House Report emphasize that § 103 
was intended to provide protection for the new contributions contained in all 
derivative works, not just those new contributions in derivative works prepared by 
the author, or a licensee, of the preexisting work. 
Persuasive authority also provides additional, implicit support for the first 
outcome.  For example, in Abend v. MCA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
proper remedy in a case where a derivative work, the film Rear Window, was held 
to infringe the original work on which it was based, a story entitled “It Had to be 
Murder.”105  In rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that injunctive relief was 
warranted, the court stressed “compelling equitable considerations which should be 
taken into account.”106  The court also correctly acknowledged the defendants’ 
substantial efforts in creating the film107 and noted that “[t]he success of the movie 
resulted in large part from factors completely unrelated to the underlying story.”108 
The Abend court’s award of damages rather than injunctive relief is an implicit 
recognition that original aspects of a derivative work added by the derivative author 
 
 103. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57-58 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 103(a)) (emphasis added).  The Report 
goes on to provide two examples:  “Thus, an unauthorized translation of a novel could not be 
copyrighted at all, but the owner of copyright in an anthology of poetry could sue someone who 
infringed the whole anthology, even though the infringer proves that publication of one of the poems 
was unauthorized.”  Id.  These examples support the blocking copyrights doctrine.  It would be difficult, 
if not impossible, for instance, to sever the original work from a translation (it is the same work, but in 
different words), and the entire derivative work is based on an unlawful use of the preexisting work.  
Thus, no copyright subsists in the translation because there is no “part of the work” which is original or 
lawful.  By contrast, the anthology includes a variety of original, lawful elements that warrant copyright 
protection, such as the commentary and the selection and ordering of the works.  Although the anthology 
is a compilation, rather than a derivative work, it is still useful as an illustration of the blocking 
copyrights doctrine.  The application of the doctrine to compilations is not otherwise explored herein. 
 104. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 100, at § 3.06 (discussing House Report and noting that 
“only that portion of a derivative work . . . that employs . . . [the] preexisting work would be denied 
copyright”). 
 105. 863 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1988), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
 106. Id. at 1478. 
 107. Id. (“Defendants invested substantial money, effort, and talent in creating the ‘Rear Window’ 
film.”). 
 108. Id. at 1479. 
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are that author’s property to exploit and cannot be captured by the author of the 
preexisting work.  Moreover, the court reasoned that “[a]n injunction would also 
effectively foreclose defendants from enjoying legitimate profits derived from 
exploitation of the ‘new matter’ comprising the derivative work, which is given 
express copyright protection . . . .”109  Thus, a recognition of the rights of a 
derivative author—who need not be the author of the preexisting work—in the 
original portions she contributes to a derivative work pervades the entire opinion. 
Although the Supreme Court, in affirming the Ninth Circuit in Abend, did not 
specifically address the issue of remedy,110 Justice O’Connor did write that “[t]he 
aspects of a derivative work added by the derivative author are that author’s 
property.”111  The Supreme Court did not limit its statement to derivative authors 
who are also the authors of the preexisting works or to derivative authors who have 
permission from the author of the preexisting work.  Several unrelated district court 
opinions, while not addressing the issue in depth, also express agreement with this 
view.112 
Some courts, however, have not accepted the blocking copyrights doctrine and 
have instead interpreted the statute to reach the second outcome above.113  
Anderson v. Stallone, involving an unauthorized thirty-one page preliminary script 
for the movie Rocky IV, is the leading case on the issue.  The script at issue in 
Anderson incorporated the characters created by Sylvester Stallone (who wrote the 
Rocky screenplays) from the three previous Rocky movies.114  The court determined 
that the preliminary script was an unauthorized work due to the derivative author’s 
use of the Rocky characters without permission.115  Because of that, the court held 
that no part of the script could be granted copyright protection.116  According to the 
court, “generally no part of an infringing derivative work should be granted 
 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 216 (1990). 
 111. Id. at 223. 
 112. See Theotokatos v. Sara Lee Personal Products, 971 F. Supp. 332, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(recognizing that even when the author of a derivative work uses an underlying copyright without the 
permission of its owner, the derivative work may still be entitled to protection for its original 
contributions if the use is not pervasive, but deciding case on other grounds); Pamfiloff v. Giant 
Records, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 933, 938-39 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); JBJ Fabrics, Inc. v. Brylane, Inc., 714 
F. Supp. 107, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Section 103 of the Act does no more than limit plaintiff’s 
copyright protection to those aspects of its design which it has not unlawfully adopted, and . . . 
unauthorized use is not equivalent to unlawful use.”). 
 113. See Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff could not 
obtain copyright protection for a derivative work that infringed the preexisting work); Russell v. Price, 
612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the law “prevents unauthorized copying or other 
infringing use of the underlying work or any part of that work contained in the derivative product so 
long as the underlying work itself remains copyrighted”); Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (concluding that unauthorized derivative works are not entitled to copyright 
protection). 
 114. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 115. Earlier in its opinion, the court had determined that the characters were protected expression.  
Id. at 1166-67. 
 116. Id. at 1168. 
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copyright protection.”117  Instead, the court wrote, “[s]ection 103(a) allow[s] an 
author whose authorship essentially is the arrangement or ordering of several 
independent works to keep the copyright for his arrangement even if one of the 
underlying works he arranged is found to be used unlawfully,” thereby reading 
§ 103 to apply only to compilations.118 
Although the court did not explain its reasoning in detail, it did note that it had 
reviewed the statute and the House Report, and stated that it found the language in 
the House Report to be “muddled” and “internally inconsistent.”119  Recognizing 
that the Report “makes a general statement that non-infringing portions of a work 
should be granted protection if these portions do not employ the pre-existing 
work,” the court nonetheless reasoned, based on the Report’s use of an example 
involving a derivative work where no part of the work could be protected, i.e., a 
translation,120 that the section is “best understood as applying only to 
compilations.”121  The court further stated, “[a]lthough it is not crystal clear, it 
appears that the Committee assumed that in a derivative work the underlying work 
is ‘employed’ throughout.”122 
Such an assumption from the Report’s examples is flawed, however.  That the 
authors of the Report used one example in which a derivative work would be 
denied protection in its entirety does not mean that all unauthorized derivative 
works would be denied protection.  Indeed, if Congress had intended such a general 
prohibition, there would be no need to give the example at all; the statute could 
simply pronounce the general prohibition instead.  At most, the Report’s example 
indicates that a pervasive use of the underlying work might make an unauthorized 
derivative work unprotectable due to the impossibility of separating out the 
“material contributed by the [derivative] author of such work.”123 
The court’s holding that the provision was not intended to apply to derivative 
works also ignores the statutory language.  Section 103(a) states that both 
compilations and derivative works are copyrightable subject matter, and it does not 
limit the rights extended therein to authorized or licensed uses of the underlying 
work.  Indeed, the provision is entitled “Compilations and Derivative Works.”124  
Further, the definition of “derivative work” in the Copyright Act belies the 
Anderson court’s belief that the House Committee assumed the underlying work 
 
 117. Id.; see also id. at 1165 (prefacing a section of the opinion with the title, “Since Anderson’s 
Work Is An Unauthorized Derivative Work, No Part of the Treatment Can Be Granted Copyright 
Protection”). 
 118. Id. at 1169. 
 119. Id. at 1168.  Regarding compilations, the court said, “[t]he infringing portion would be easily 
severable and the scope of the compilation author’s own work would be easily ascertainable.”  Id. at 
1169. 
 120. See supra note 103 (setting out examples from House Report). 
 121. Anderson, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168. 
 122. Id. 
 123. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012).  The Anderson court would provide copyright protection to 
compilations because “[t]he infringing portion would be easily severable and the scope of the 
compilations author’s own work would easily ascertainable.”  11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (emphasis added). 
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would necessarily be employed throughout the derivative work.125  The Act’s 
definition is not so narrow as that, and Congress could have explicitly defined 
“derivative work” differently had it intended such a result. 
The Anderson court’s reliance on two cases, Gracen v. Bradford Exchange126 
and Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co.,127 is similarly flawed.128  In 
Gracen, a case involving paintings and drawings of still scenes in a movie, the 
court stated without analysis that no part of an unlawful derivative work could be 
copyrighted.129  The court’s comments were made in dicta, however, as the direct 
issue addressed by the Gracen court was only whether the plaintiff’s derivative 
works had sufficient originality to merit protection when they had been prepared 
with the specific intent of reproducing scenes from the underlying movie.130  
Indeed, much of the court’s analysis would have been superfluous had it 
conclusively determined that an unauthorized derivative work could not be granted 
copyright protection, because in that case originality would be irrelevant. 
The statement in Eden Toys the Anderson court relied upon was likewise dicta.  
The Eden Toys court had assumed that “[unauthorized] derivative copyrights would 
be invalid, since the pre-existing illustration used without permission would ‘tend . 
. . to pervade the entire derivative work.’”131  The court’s decision, however, rested 
only on the issues whether the derivative author held a valid license or owned a 
copyright in the preexisting work and whether a derivative work was sufficiently 
original so as to warrant copyright protection.132  Moreover, read fully, the Eden 
Toys opinion is actually consistent with a doctrine of blocking copyrights, which 
recognizes that if the preexisting work is indeed so pervasive that no original 
material can be separated out so as to obtain copyright protection, there is no 
identifiable derivative copyright as a practical matter.133  In Eden Toys, the court 
simply did not have to engage in the “filtering” process to determine the scope of 
the derivative copyright.  In fact, the court apparently would agree with successive 
 
 125. See supra note 7 (setting out definition of “derivative work”). 
 126. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 127. 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 128. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (“The case law interpreting section 103(a) also supports the 
conclusion that generally no part of an infringing derivative work should be granted copyright 
protection.” (citing Gracen, 698 F.2d at 302-03 and Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 34-35)). 
 129. 698 F.2d at 303. 
 130. Id. at 301. 
 131. 697 F.2d at 34 n.6 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 3.06 (1978)). 
 132. Id. at 33-36.  The Anderson court even acknowledged that the statement was dicta.  See 11 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (“[I]n dicta the court opined on what result would be warranted if the 
derivative work had been made without the permission of the original author.”). 
 133. See infra Part III.D (noting that derivative author bears risk of lack of severability).  Another 
case resolved against a derivative author was decided on this ground.  See Sobhani v. @Radical.Media, 
Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240-41 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that the author of an unauthorized 
derivative work could not sue for infringement because the preexisting work pervaded the derivative 
work and any purported separable elements did not meet substantive standards for copyright protection).  
The Sobhani court cited Eden Toys as “suggesting that copyright might subsist in a derivative work 
making unauthorized use of other copyrighted work, provided the original work does not ‘pervade’ the 
derivative work.”  Id. at 1240. 
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tiers of copyright protection for derivative works, but only had to address the issue 
with respect to authorized works.134 
In addition to these flaws in the Anderson court’s decision and the lack of clarity 
in the statutory provisions,135 changes in the law of copyright remedies have set the 
stage for even greater acceptance of blocking copyrights. 
III.  REDESIGNED REMEDIES FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS 
Courts use a variety of mechanisms to police the boundary between copyright’s 
exclusionary rights and the public domain, including threshold requirements for 
establishing copyright protection, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 
doctrine.  The remedy granted is another tool that courts can use.136  Even the 
incorrect interpretation of § 103 offered by the Anderson court does not foreclose 
consideration of what remedy would be appropriate for the violation of a right, as a 
question separate from the existence of that right, as discussed below.137  This 
Article accordingly argues that courts can and should effectuate the doctrine of 
blocking copyrights through the remedies they grant. 
A.  A SEA CHANGE IN COPYRIGHT REMEDIES 
Recent changes to the availability of injunctive relief for copyright infringement 
make the incorporation of principles related to improvers of tangible property into 
copyright law even more promising.  The Copyright Act provides that a court “may 
. . . grant temporary or final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to 
prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”138  Historically, lower courts in 
copyright cases applied a presumption of irreparable harm and granted plaintiffs 
injunctive relief as a matter of course following a finding of infringement.139 
The tide began to turn, however, with the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in 
 
 134. See Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 35 (describing three successive tiers of valid copyrights, but 
assuming in its analysis that the derivative author has a valid license in the preexisting work, which was 
a pivotal issue raised). 
 135. See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm and Injunctions, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
11, 13 (2012) (“Statutory ambiguities should be resolved against excessively broad rights, including the 
derivative works right . . . .”). 
 136. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair, Jr., Comment, Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling 
Innocence in a Strict-Liability Context, 58 CAL. L. REV. 940, 945 (1970) (“[T]he felt unfairness of the 
absolute liability imposed by the Act has been mitigated only indirectly through the courts’ studied 
manipulation of the monetary remedies afforded against the infringer.”); John Tehranian, Whither 
Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. 
REV. 1201, 1207 (2005) (proposing an alteration of available remedies for transformative uses of 
copyrighted works to accommodate First Amendment concerns in fair use doctrine). 
 137. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.  In other words, to say that an unauthorized 
derivative work is infringing does not dictate that a particular remedy be granted. 
 138. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012). 
 139. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]raditionally, this Court has 
presumed that a plaintiff likely to prevail on the merits of a copyright claim is also likely to suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.”); Wainwright Secs., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 
558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[I]njury can normally be presumed when a copyright is infringed.”). 
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.140  In eBay, the Court held that the flexible, 
permissive “may . . . grant” language in the statute governing injunctive relief in 
patent cases should be taken literally and that courts should not apply categorical 
rules or presumptions.141  Rather than axiomatically issuing injunctions, then, 
Justice Thomas wrote that courts have discretion to grant or deny injunctive relief 
based on consideration of four factors that balance the competing interests of the 
plaintiff and defendant:  (1) irreparable harm to the plaintiff; (2) adequacy of 
remedies available at law, such as damages; (3) balance of hardships between the 
plaintiff and defendant; and (4) whether the public interest would be disserved by a 
permanent injunction.142  In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained that “the 
creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that 
right.”143  Thus, acknowledging that a party possesses a right that has been violated 
does not necessitate a grant of injunctive relief to protect that right. 
In recent decisions, courts have correctly extended eBay to copyright cases.  
Although eBay involved patent law, the Supreme Court pointed out the similarities 
in the copyright and patent statutes and commented on injunctive relief in the 
copyright context, noting that the Court “has consistently rejected invitations to 
replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction 
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed.”144  In 
the years following eBay, circuit courts have applied the case’s holding in the 
copyright context, and as a result, they no longer presume irreparable harm 
following a finding of infringement.145  Instead, courts have begun to look more 
carefully at the actual harm the plaintiff would suffer from copyright infringement.  
For example, in Perfect 10 v. Google,146 Perfect 10 sought a preliminary injunction 
to bar Google from displaying a series of copyrighted photographs.  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief, explaining, “our 
 
 140. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 141. Id. at 391-94.  The Patent Act’s provision for injunctive relief reads, “The several courts 
having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of 
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable.”  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012). 
 142. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  This reasoning further undermines decisions such as Pickett v. Prince, 
207 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2000), cited supra note 113, which implicitly rejected a blocking copyrights 
doctrine for the reason that “[t]he Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”  207 F.3d at 405. 
 143. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392. 
 144. Id.; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 n.10 (1994) (noting that 
the goals of the copyright system are not always best served by granting an injunction); Amoco Prod. 
Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (“In each case, a court must balance the competing 
claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the 
requested relief.”). 
 145. See Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The 
Supreme Court [in eBay] reaffirmed the traditional showing that a plaintiff must make to obtain a 
permanent injunction in any type of case, including a patent or copyright case.”); see also Salinger v. 
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that eBay applies in the copyright context); 
CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World 
Inst. of Scientology Enters. Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 146. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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longstanding rule that a showing of a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits 
in a copyright infringement claim raises a presumption of irreparable harm is 
clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning of the Court’s decision in eBay and has 
therefore been effectively overruled.”147  Instead, the court required Perfect 10 to 
provide actual proof that the market substitution that it alleged was occurring had 
been caused by Google’s use of the photographs.148 
The circuit court decisions applying eBay in the copyright context give renewed 
momentum to the possibility of tempering the harsh treatment of derivative authors 
and avoiding the problem of copyright holdout.  Although courts occasionally 
refused to grant injunctive relief before eBay,149 they are more likely to do so now.  
Courts should no longer rely on unsupported, speculative assumptions about the 
harm that owners of copyrighted works might suffer from uses of their works.  
Instead, courts should base remedies on the likelihood that a copyright defendant’s 
activity will actually lead to harm.  This is particularly true when considering an 
already existing creative work (the derivative work) that meets the requirements for 
copyright protection.  Such a work should not be suppressed for the sake of a 
supposed incentive that may not be supported by the facts of a given case, nor by 
empirical evidence regarding incentives in the copyright system generally.150 
B.  RETHINKING GOOD FAITH 
As courts continue to adjust the law of copyright remedies following eBay, they 
should take advantage of this opportunity to incorporate principles that are more 
favorable to improvers, as seen in the context of tangible property,151 when dealing 
with derivative works.  This suggestion fits well within eBay’s framework, which 
dictates an approach to remedies that is equitable, discretionary and based on actual 
harm.  Because some of the rules granting improvers relief under property or tort 
law require the improver to have acted with innocent intent,152 however, the 
concept of good faith requires further consideration in the context of derivative 
works before those rules can be incorporated into copyright law. 
Typical forms of innocent or good faith infringement do occur in the copyright 
realm.153  For instance, a defendant may subconsciously copy another creator’s 
 
 147. Id. at 981 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 148. Id. at 981-82. 
 149. See, e.g., Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “special 
circumstances” would cause “great injustice” to defendants and “public injury” if the court were to issue 
an injunction); Love v. Kwitny, 772 F. Supp. 1367, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that damages were 
sufficient to compensate for infringement where copyrighted material comprised 2.6% of defendant’s 
book). 
 150. See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text (discussing limits to copyright law’s ability to 
incentivize creative works). 
 151. See supra Part I.B. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The Copyright Act sets forth a strict liability standard, providing that “[a]nyone who violates 
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the 
author, as the case may be.”  17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012); see also Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 
U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (“Intention to infringe is not essential under the [Copyright] Act.”). 
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work.154  In an infamous case, the Southern District of New York held in 1976 that 
George Harrison inadvertently plagiarized sequences of notes and the harmony of 
his song, “My Sweet Lord,” from the Chiffons’ 1963 single, “He’s So Fine.”155  A 
defendant may also justifiably believe that her use of a work does not constitute 
copyright infringement, for instance due to questions about the validity of the 
owner’s copyright or the applicability of a defense.156  A defendant may also be 
unaware of the infringing activities of a third party that nevertheless subject her to 
liability.157 
Judges and scholars have persuasively argued that improvers who act with 
mental states such as these should be treated more leniently under copyright law.  
In particular, they have criticized the Copyright Act’s harsh strict liability standard 
in these contexts.158  Applied to derivative works, the complaints arguably have 
even more force because the improver has by definition added something of value 
to the preexisting work, thus furthering the goals of the copyright system in ways 
that mere copyists do not.  These types of infringing behavior should continue to be 
considered to meet the definition of good faith and be entitled to more favorable 
treatment, such as that applied to improvers of tangible property, when the 
defendant’s actions result in a derivative work. 
The copying involved in creating derivative works, however, is typically much 
more deliberate.  A creator who sets out to improve upon another’s work is often 
 
 154. See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482-85 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming 
jury verdict for plaintiff where copyright holder had advanced a “theory of widespread dissemination 
and subconscious copying”); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) 
(“With so many sources before them [the defendants] might quite honestly forget what they took; 
nobody knows the origin of his inventions; memory and fancy merge even in adults.  Yet unconscious 
plagiarism is actionable quite as much as deliberate.”); Northern Music Co. v. Pacemaker Music Corp., 
147 U.S.P.Q. 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting the possibility that copying may be subconscious); Fred 
Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (same). 
 155. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976), aff’d sub nom. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-99 (2d Cir. 
1983).  In a fascinating set of facts, Harrison later solved the problem by acquiring the rights to “He’s So 
Fine,” but only after Harrison’s disgruntled former manager had covertly purchased the rights in breach 
of his fiduciary duty.  ABKCO Music, 722 F.2d at 994-96. 
 156. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant’s belief that it was not infringing was not unreasonable in view of 
unsettled nature of fair use defense). 
 157. See Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., 29 F. Supp. 729, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (concluding that 
the operator of a movie theater that exhibited an infringing movie was “unquestionably an innocent 
infringer”). 
 158. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(noting the “harshness of the principle of strict liability in copyright law”); Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 
427, 427 (2d Cir. 1939) (“It has been held that one who copies from a plagiarist is himself necessarily a 
plagiarist, however innocent he may be, but that would be a harsh result, and contrary to the general 
doctrine of torts . . . .  [W]e should hesitate a long while before holding that the use of material, 
apparently in the public demesne, subjected the user to damages, unless something put him actually on 
notice.” (citing American Press Ass’n v. Daily Story Publ’g Co., 120 F. 766 (7th Cir. 1902))); Dane S. 
Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 351, 351 
(2002) (calling for Congress to abolish strict liability for copyright infringement and to substitute instead 
a liability scheme “that fairly accounts for the culpability of infringers”). 
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by necessity acting intentionally with reference to the underlying work, at least in 
the sense that she wants to use the underlying work in some way, if not also in the 
sense that she is aware of the legal ramifications of her use.  A key purpose of 
derivative works is to rely on the work of others as a foundation for new creative 
endeavors.159  But this state of mind will often subject an improver to increased 
monetary penalties.160  Much of the copying done in preparing a derivative work 
thus does not meet the standard of good faith that is required or is a factor under 
some tort and real property doctrines dealing with improvers.161 
Nevertheless, the contributions of derivative authors are still worthy of 
protection, and the principles of relief for improvers in the tangible property realm 
can still be effective in the context of derivative works.  Not all rules granting relief 
to an improver require that the improver act in good faith.162  Where good faith is 
required, the law should broaden the concept to encompass unauthorized derivative 
works under some circumstances.  Judges frequently use the concept of good faith 
to effectuate larger policy goals.163  If the availability of good faith were limited to 
situations where improvements are made on works in the public domain, this would 
result in a much smaller class of derivative works and fail to allow for the most 
timely, most relevant creative advancements.164  Thus, although the traditional 
arguments regarding mistake, actions under color of title, bona fide purchasers and 
good faith will apply to a subset of copyright improvers, the definition of good faith 
 
 159. As Mark Lemley aptly explains: 
The value of improvements is precisely that they allow developers to build on what others have 
done before them, rather than having to start from scratch.  It would be perverse indeed to 
require that “improvers” not make any use of the material they are supposedly improving.  It 
would also be inefficient, putting improvers to a significant duplication of effort for no 
appreciable societal gain. 
Lemley, supra note 19, at 1040. 
 160. Copyright infringement is typically considered to be willful if the infringer knows that her 
conduct is infringing or if the infringer has acted in reckless disregard of the copyright owner’s right.  
See, e.g., Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 1991) (setting out 
willful infringement standard); Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d Cir. 
1986) (noting that defendant’s knowledge that his actions constituted copyright infringement establishes 
that the defendant acted willfully, triggering the availability of enhanced damages under the Copyright 
Act). 
 161. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.1(a) (West 2013) (defining a “good faith improver” as 
“[a] person who makes an improvement to land in good faith and under the erroneous belief, because of 
a mistake of law or fact, that he is the owner of the land”); Manning v. Wingo, 577 So. 2d 865, 869 (Ala. 
1991) (defining good faith improver as one who makes valuable improvements “under the mistaken 
belief that he owns the land”); Miller v. Gasaway, 514 S.W. 2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (“For one 
to qualify as a good faith improver under the equitable rule of ‘betterments’ he must show not only that 
he believed that he was the true owner of the land but also that he had reasonable grounds for that belief, 
and that he was ignorant that his title was contested by any person having a better right.”). 
 162. See supra Part I.B. 
 163. Cf. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions Of 
The Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 198 (1968) (“By invoking good faith . . . it may be 
possible for a judge to do justice and do it according to law.”). 
 164. A derivative work of a popular book, for example, is likely to be more beneficial to the public 
close in time to the publication of the book, rather than fifty years later.  See supra note 60 and 
accompanying text (noting that value of derivative works is time-sensitive). 
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in the context of derivative works additionally bears rethinking in order to better 
achieve the overarching goals of copyright law. 
Although a comprehensive definition of good faith is not possible, and the term 
is often used to exclude conduct, rather than to express the positive content of a 
standard,165 examples of behavior that demonstrate good faith can be used to guide 
courts’ decisions.  For instance, good faith could be shown by the derivative 
author’s meaningful attempts to negotiate a license or cross-license with the owner 
of the preexisting work, particularly if those attempts occur before the derivative 
work is made.  Courts may also look for cooperation during those negotiations, 
such as in providing records or other documentation without resort to litigation, and 
consider the reasonableness of any license agreement proposed by the derivative 
author.  Moreover, the derivative author’s efforts in seeking legal advice and the 
amount of effort and resources invested in preparing the derivative work may be 
relevant as well. 
To the extent that this is a departure from the treatment of improvers of tangible 
property that serves as a touchstone for this Article’s proposal, it is warranted.  
Indeed, legal concepts from tort and property law, albeit useful comparators, must 
be modified to take into account the goals and policies of the copyright system.  In 
particular, copyright law’s utilitarian underpinnings are a crucial distinction.  
Although property law and tort law are certainly beneficial and useful to society as 
a whole in providing means to peacefully resolve disputes, their focus is on 
remedying the rights of individuals. 
Copyright law, in contrast, exists not to serve the individual but to advance the 
public interest.166  The Intellectual Property Clause in the Constitution vests 
Congress with the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”167  The individual’s exclusive right is a 
necessary byproduct of the constitutional aim to advance creative endeavors for the 
public as a whole.  As Justice Stewart explained, “[t]he economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way 
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science 
 
 165. Summers, supra note 163 at 197 (noting, in the context of contract law, that “the duties judges 
have imposed in the name of contractual good faith are more varied and numerous than anyone has yet 
recognized in print”). 
 166. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The 
monopoly privileges [in copyright law] that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit.  Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important 
public purpose may be achieved.”); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 
(2d Cir. 1966) (taking into account policies of copyright law in balancing of equities and concluding that 
“the public interest should prevail over the possible damage to the copyright owner”); H.R. REP. NO. 60-
2222, at 7 (1909) (report of House committee that recommended 1909 Copyright Act, noting that 
copyright law is “[n]ot primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the 
public”). 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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and useful Arts.’”168  Justice Stewart explained this trade off, writing, “[t]he 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author’s 
creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.”169  Indeed, “[t]he copyright law, like the 
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”170 
In addition, a copyright improver’s work does not simply inure to her own 
personal benefit.  An author who builds on a preexisting work does not appropriate 
the preexisting work in the same sense that an improver of a chattel does.  
Intellectual property is nonrivalrous.171  Unlike a chattel that can only be enjoyed 
by one user or a very limited number of users at one time, works of authorship can 
benefit the public generally once they are produced.  Indeed, the premise of the 
copyright system is that creative works will have such a benefit for the public.172  
Tort and property law largely do not have to consider the impact on the public with 
regard to an improvement in a tangible asset. 
Even under the broader definition of good faith posited by this Article, a 
derivative author cannot “excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he 
did not pirate.”173  Importantly, the derivative creator is not avoiding liability under 
this approach.174  But courts should take the degree of the derivative author’s 
culpability into account in determining remedies.175  Moreover, the improver’s 
entitlement is not based on how much she did not take from an underlying work 
(indeed, she may have taken all of it), but instead only on the value of her own 
original contributions.  To set out to improve a copyrighted work is a worthwhile 
endeavor that, in general, should be encouraged by the law.  Indeed, improvers who 
undertake that effort openly and deliberately are engaged in a useful enterprise that 
is no less valid and is perhaps more efficient than improvers who independently 
develop a work that turns out to be similar, yet a narrow definition of good faith 
 
 168. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also 
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 27 (7th ed. 2006) (“[T]he classically dominant view of American 
copyright law is instrumental in character:  Copyright is seen as a means by which the general welfare is 
advanced through the provision of economic incentives to creators (and . . . disseminators) of new works 
of the intellect.”). 
 169. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 170. U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
 171. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:  What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501, 526 (1999) (discussing the nonrivalrous character of intellectual property). 
 172.  Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein have argued the related and important point about 
works that add creativity to an underlying work; in this case, the new works 
[do] not destroy the copied work . . . .  Nor does expressive accession necessarily dilute the 
income-generating opportunities of the copied work’s owner.  The owner can still sell his work 
or allow others to use it for a fee in exactly the same way in which he could do so before the 
accession. 
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1527. 
 173. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (addressing the fair 
use defense). 
 174. See supra Parts I.A.2 & II; infra Part III.C. 
 175. Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The fact that an infringement is 
‘subconscious’ or ‘innocent’ does not affect liability, although it may have some bearing on remedies.”). 
37.1 MULLALLY ARTICLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  12:51 PM 
2013] BLOCKING COPYRIGHTS REVISITED 87 
would treat the former more harshly than the latter.176 
Moreover, many traditional bases for a finding of willful infringement would 
still apply under the approach suggested herein, and derivative authors may still be 
held liable for willful infringement.  For example, an improver who unreasonably 
refuses to take a license, while knowing where and how to obtain one, might be 
held to have willfully infringed.177  Similarly, an improver who eschews paying 
agreed-upon licensing fees,178 ignores offers of licenses by copyright owners,179 or 
fails to participate in court proceedings180 could be treated more harshly.  Thus, 
redefining our notion of good faith in the context of derivative works would allow 
courts to treat improvers more fairly, while still maintaining limits.  
C.  ADDITIONAL CONTOURS OF REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENT BY 
UNAUTHORIZED DERIVATIVE WORKS 
Along with the removal of injunctive relief and a reworking of the definition of 
good faith, courts should incorporate several guiding criteria in crafting an 
appropriate remedy, particularly in damages determinations,181 to effectuate the 
principles of blocking copyrights.  First, courts should consider mitigation of 
damages.  Not all forms of derivative works lead to an equal likelihood of harm.  
Rather than supplant an underlying copyrighted work, a derivative work may 
increase demand for it.182  Indeed, “[h]ighly creative works are likely to enhance 
 
 176. Cf. Lemley, supra note 19, at 1040 (“I am dubious of the claim that improving on someone 
else’s work is somehow more culpable than independent development of a work that happens to be 
similar.”). 
 177. Cf. Meadowgreen Music Co. v. Voice in the Wilderness Broad., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 823, 827 
(E.D. Tex. 1992) (holding that a radio station’s infringement of copyrighted songs was willful where the 
radio station admitted to knowing that a license was required, knew where a license could be obtained, 
and did not obtain a license on the basis that the musicians whose work was involved had stated their 
intention to minister through their Christian music broadcast on the radio). 
 178. Cf. Music City Music v. Alfa Foods, Ltd., 616 F. Supp. 1001, 1003-04 (E.D. Va. 1985) 
(defendant failed, after repeated notice, to pay licensing fees). 
 179. Cf. EMI April Music, Inc. v. White, 618 F. Supp. 2d 497, 509 (E.D. Va. 2009) (copyright 
infringer was offered a license on numerous occasions and failed to respond). 
 180. Cf. Realsongs, Universal Music Corp. v. 3A North Park Ave. Rest Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 81, 
84 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (copyright infringer failed to answer or otherwise move in response to complaint). 
 181. Scholars have made compelling arguments in favor of abrogating statutory damages for 
copyright infringement.  See, e.g., Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for 
Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability:  Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267-69 (2009) (noting problems with statutory damages); Alex 
Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
513, 526 (1999) (suggesting that statutory damages be eliminated for derivative works); Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law:  A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (noting flaws with statutory damages provision and courts’ 
application of it).  If, however, a copyright holder suing an unauthorized derivative author seeks to 
invoke the statutory damages mechanism rather than establish actual damages, the principles discussed 
herein still apply and militate toward the lowest end of the statutory range.  See 15 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) 
(2012) (stating that “the copyright owner may elect . . . to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, 
an award of statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, 
. . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” (emphasis added)). 
 182. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1527 (“[T]he linkage between the first work and the 
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the value of the preexisting works from which they borrow.”183  Authors of 
derivative works often contribute additions or elaborations that meet or exceed 
those of the author of the preexisting work, adding considerable value to the 
preexisting work.184  As in the case of improvers of tangible property, these effects, 
if shown, should be permitted to offset damages owed to the copyright holder.185 
In addition, courts should not presume that the author of the preexisting work 
has an interest in exploiting the market for derivative works.  Central to the 
proposal in this Article is the requirement that a derivative author compensate the 
owner of the preexisting work.186  The owner of the preexisting material should 
indeed be able to extract economic value from her work.  Under a blocking 
copyrights regime, each party should receive a share of the commercial gains 
realized from the derivative work that is proportional to the value of each 
contribution.187  If the value of the derivative work depends too heavily upon the 
value of the preexisting work, then it might not be profitable for the derivative 
author to proceed—a risk the derivative author must bear. 
Where the preexisting copyright owner has made no effort to build on the 
underlying work, however, damages should be far less.  Not all authors are 
motivated to prepare derivative works, nor are they necessarily incentivized by the 
potential right to prepare derivative works.188  Courts should instead investigate the 
likelihood that the specific author of the preexisting work at issue will exercise the 
derivative works right as to that specific preexisting work, along with how much 
harm the unauthorized derivative work would actually cause.  The eBay decision 
and the cases applying it in the copyright context make clear that courts should no 
longer presume harm to the copyright owner, and this is especially true regarding 
 
new creation increases the copied work’s visibility and promotes its sales.”); see also Núñez v. 
Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that a photograph of a beauty 
pageant reproduced in a newspaper that “illustrat[ed] controversy” increased demand for the 
photograph); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 201, 205-06 (D. Mass. 1986) (noting 
that in the six months following defendant’s (nonderivative) reproduction of plaintiff’s works, plaintiff 
sold twice as many copies of the works than in the previous year, successfully sold reproduction rights 
to the works, and exhibited the works in art galleries); Glyn Moody, Psy Makes $8.1 Million by Ignoring 
Copyright Infringements of Gangnam Style, TECHDIRT (Dec. 10, 2012, 10:15 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/casestudies/ 
articles/20121209/07431921317/psy-makes-81-million-ignoring-copyright-infringements-gangnam-
style.shtml (discussing income generated despite nonenforcement of copyright in song). 
 183. Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 48, at 1527. 
 184. See, e.g., Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting equities in 
favor of author of derivative work and that author of derivative work “will often have made 
contributions literary, musical and economic as great as or greater than the original author”). 
 185. See Childress v. Taylor, 798 F. Supp. 981, 997 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that defendant’s 
contributions to the copyrighted work mitigates damages). 
 186. See supra Part I.A.2. (describing blocking copyrights). 
 187. Cf. Kozinski & Newman, supra note 181, at 525 (suggesting that courts should not have to 
choose between injunctive relief and fair use for derivative works, and that remedy instead should be 
limited to a pro rata accounting of profits and actual damages). 
 188. See infra notes 222-225 and accompanying text (discussing limits to copyright law’s ability to 
incentivize creative works). 
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harm to the market for derivative works.189  Indeed, even before eBay, the Supreme 
Court had held that while the “licensing of derivatives is an important economic 
incentive to the creation of originals,” there are limits, and “[t]he market for 
potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would 
in general develop or license others to develop.”190  Thus, rather than being 
absolute, a copyright owner’s ability to assert her derivative rights should at most 
include those markets she intends to enter or reasonably could be expected to 
exploit.191 
In some cases, this can be easily determined.  For example, an author may have 
already begun work on a derivative project or may have a well established practice 
of preparing or licensing derivative works.192  At the other extreme, an author may 
have expressly disavowed any interest in preparing derivative works.193  Policies of 
the copyright system militate even more strongly in the latter situation in favor of 
permissive use of the preexisting work, with concepts similar to the doctrine of 
waste in property law and the requirement of “working” intellectual property in 
Europe at play.194  Copyright law in general is designed to provide an economic 
incentive for the production of creative works,195 and the derivative works 
provision in particular provides the right “to prepare works based upon the 
 
 189. See supra Part III.A.  As Christina Bohannan has explained, 
The first factor of the test for injunctive relief makes the injury caused by copyright infringement 
a central inquiry.  The plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that some actual injury is likely to 
occur, even if it cannot prove the full extent of the injury.  This means that the plaintiff cannot 
rely on speculative claims that it might suffer some harm in the future.  Moreover, the injury has 
to be irreparable. 
Bohannan, supra note 135, at 18. 
 190. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592-93 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 191. See Bohannan, supra note 135, at 14 (arguing that copyright plaintiffs should be required to 
prove meaningful harm to their incentives to produce creative works). 
 192. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 519 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that author J.K. Rowling had already written two short companion books to the 
Harry Potter series and stated on numerous occasions her intent to publish a Harry Potter encyclopedia 
after completion of the series); MERGES ET AL., supra note 97, at 556 (“No one has exploited this broad 
reach of protection [in the right to prepare derivative works] more successfully than George Lucas, who 
built a multi-billion dollar Star Wars empire on merchandise—including toys, commercial tie-ins, 
clothing, books, and games.”); James Suer, Copyright and Lucas Licensing, BLOCKBUSTERFILMS (Nov. 
30, 2011), http://blockbusterfilms.wordpress.com/2011/11/30/copyright-and-lucas-licensing (“Lucas 
Licensing brings in about $3 billion a year annually.  Lucas Licensing is the synergy machine that makes 
all the additional Star Wars content possible in the way of:  toys, publishing, apparel, consumer 
electronics, house wares, and even the symphonic Star Wars experience, Star Wars In Concert.”). 
 193. J.D. Salinger famously disavowed any interest in building on his own work.  See, e.g., 
Complaint at ¶39, Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 5095) 
(“There’s no more to Holden Caulfield.  Read the book again.  It’s all there.”); see also Salinger, 641 F. 
Supp. 2d at 268 (noting that “Salinger has not demonstrated any interest in publishing a sequel or other 
derivative work”). 
 194. “Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the 
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”  Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, art. 5(A)(2), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 195. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing encouragement of new artistic works 
as purpose of copyright’s economic benefit). 
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copyrighted work.”196  If the author has no intention of creating a derivative work, 
the economic incentives of the copyright system are no longer at issue for that 
particular author, and the law should favor a subsequent creator, for whom those 
incentives can be effective, thereby serving the public interest behind the copyright 
law.197  At minimum, this could be an administrative, legal effort, if not a creative 
one, on behalf of the owner of the preexisting work.198 
Even within markets that the owner of the preexisting work might intend to 
enter, recognition of the copyright owner’s right to prepare derivative works does 
not mandate the issuance of injunctive relief, as opposed to damages.199  SunTrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. provides a useful example.200  The case involved 
litigation over Margaret Mitchell’s revered novel, Gone with the Wind, and Alice 
Randall’s parody, The Wind Done Gone.  Before the lawsuit, the plaintiff had 
already been actively engaged in negotiating and granting licenses for several 
derivative books, including two sequel novels.201  At least one agreement included 
contractual restrictions as to content that specifically contemplated the preparation 
of additional derivative works.202  Relying on this and other evidence, the plaintiff 
argued that The Wind Done Gone would hinder its continued ability to grant 
licenses.203  The court, however, refused to enjoin the defendant’s unauthorized 
derivative work, despite the plaintiff’s actual and potential exploitation of the 
market for derivative works.204  Significantly, at least one of the authorized sequels 
 
 196. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 197. See Yen, supra note 58, at 92 (“[C]opyright need not protect uses that authors have no 
intention of exploiting, for protecting those uses would have no effect on copyright’s financial 
incentives.”). 
 198. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 251-52 (2002) (arguing in favor of copyright system that would require copyright 
holders to renew copyright registrations every five years); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473 (2003) (arguing in favor of copyright 
system that would require copyright holders to renew copyright registrations every ten years). 
 199. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the goals of the copyright system may 
outweigh granting an injunction to an individual copyright holder in any given case.  Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (“[C]ourts may also wish to bear in mind that the goals 
of copyright law, ‘to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,’ are not always best 
served by automatically granting injunctive relief.” (citation omitted)); see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward 
a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132 (1990) (noting that while injunctive relief may be 
warranted in cases of simple piracy, it is not appropriate where there is “a strong public interest in the 
publication of the secondary work [a]nd the copyright owner’s interest may be adequately protected by 
an award of damages for whatever infringement is found.”). 
 200. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 201. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction at 2, 4-5, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001) (No. 1:01-CV-701-CAP) (describing licensing activities), available at http://www. 
houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/randall_url/pdf/Memorandum_Plaintiff_Restraining_Order_Prelimi
nary_Injunction.pdf. 
 202. Id. at 4-5 (“[T]he contract for the Second Sequel specifically provides that neither Scarlett 
O’Hara nor Rhett Butler may die, thus preserving the expectations of an avid reading public, as well as 
the Mitchell Trusts’ ability to authorize sequels in the future.”). 
 203. Id. at 2 (asserting negative impact of The Wind Done Gone). 
 204. 268 F.3d at 1277 (setting aside lower court’s injunction). 
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was later published, seemingly unaffected by publication of The Wind Done 
Gone.205 
This Article’s proposal thus continues to provide a stimulus to authors to build 
on their own work and to counteract the stagnation that may otherwise occur.206  
Because copyright authors automatically receive rights for their entire lives plus 
one generation, their incentive to make improvements is already lower compared to 
other areas of intellectual property.  Blocking copyrights allows for a more 
particular, circumscribed consideration of harm to the copyright owner, so that the 
use of each work can be optimized. 
Another consideration that should be affirmatively excluded in assessing 
damages for infringement of the derivative right is the desire of the author of the 
preexisting work to exert editorial management over the work or aspects of the 
work.  Some copyright holders seek to control the products of their creative efforts 
absolutely, and they rely on the derivative right to attempt to do so.  For example, 
the administrators of the Margaret Mitchell Trust sought to ensure that sequels to 
Gone with the Wind did not involve homosexuality, miscegenation, or the death of 
any main characters.207  Some courts have expressed sympathy for this desire to 
control.208 
The idea of such broad and subjective authorial control over how a work is 
interpreted is on questionable footing as a matter of literary theory,209 however, and 
 
 205. DONALD MCCAIG, RHETT BUTLER’S PEOPLE (2007). 
 206. See, e.g., U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (“Many people 
believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift, and 
depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial 
progress.”); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1060 (2005) (describing how giving creators control over improvements and new uses that might be 
made of their works restricts progress in a variety of ways). 
 207. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (noting contractual restrictions); Declaration of 
Pat Conroy at 1, SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (No. 
1:01-CV-701-CAP), available at http://www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com/features/randall_url/pdf/ 
Declaration_Pat_Conroy.pdf (stating that estate of Margaret Mitchell required a pledge that Conroy, if 
granted permission to write sequel to Gone with the Wind, would not “write anything about 
miscegenation or homosexuality.”). 
 208. For example, the district court for the Southern District of New York wrote: 
[S]ome artists may be further incentivized to create original works due to the availability of the 
right not to produce any sequels.  This might be the case if, for instance, an author’s artistic 
vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his character’s story to the varied 
imaginations of his readers, or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and 
speculation as to what happened subsequently.  Just as licensing of derivatives is an important 
economic incentive to the creation of originals, so too will the right not to license derivatives 
sometimes act as an incentive to the creation of originals. 
Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); see also 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that a 
among a copyright holder’s rights is “the right, within broad limits, to curb the development of such a 
derivative market by refusing to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright 
owner finds acceptable”). 
 209. See, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in DAVID H. RICHTER, FALLING INTO 
THEORY, CONFLICTING VIEWS ON READING LITERATURE 222, 225 (1994) (describing post-structural 
literary theory and noting, “a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination [with the reader]”); 
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the law should not be used to effectuate such dominion over the work.  Indeed, 
copyright law is intended to provide an incentive for creators in the form of an 
economic benefit, not in the form of exclusive control of all possible uses of the 
work.  Exerting such control over a work through the derivative works right is even 
more troublesome when the estate or heirs of the initial author are asserting the 
copyright.  With copyright protection extending well beyond the author’s lifetime, 
it is often remote rights holders who seek to control the creation of derivative 
works.210  This kind of control is undesirable when exerted by the author herself 
and is even less defensible when exerted by remote rights holders who do not 
necessarily have any special understanding of the author’s intentions.211 
Lastly, deterrence should not play a role in determining damages when a 
derivative author has acted in good faith, as defined in this Article.  Courts often 
take into consideration the deterrent value of sanctions in imposing punishment on 
a copyright infringer.212  Yet, when the defendant has acted in good faith and is 
furthering the purpose of the copyright system by making more creative works 
available to the public—the very activity that the copyright system wants to 
encourage rather than dissuade—theories of deterrence and punishment should not 
factor into the appropriate remedy. 
D.  FEAR OF LOKEY FROM MALDEMAR AND OTHER POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
In 1978, Lisa Litchfield wrote a one act musical play, entitled Lokey from 
Maldemar, about the adventures of two aliens on Earth.213  Litchfield later sent her 
play to Universal City Studios (“Universal”) in the hope that Universal would enter 
into an agreement with her to develop the play into a movie, but Universal 
declined.214  After Universal released its movie, E.T., about an alien who lands on 
Earth and befriends three children and their mother, Litchfield sued Universal, 
 
William K. Wimsatt, Jr. & Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in W.K. WIMSATT, JR., THE 
VERBAL ICON 1, 5 (Univ. of Ky. Press 1954) (“The poem is not the critic’s own and not the author’s (it 
is detached from the author at birth and goes about the world beyond his power to intend about it or 
control it).  The poem belongs to the public.”). 
 210. See Spoo, supra note 49, at 1781, 1821-26 (noting that heirs and estates of authors “use 
extended copyrights to discourage or control the use of . . . works by scholars, critics and others”). 
 211. See id. at 1827 (“Extremely long copyrights have placed monopoly control in the hands of 
heirs and transferees who are remote historically, and sometimes temperamentally, from the authors 
whose rights they administer and from the origins of the writings they jealously protect.  Genetic 
connection is no guarantee of literary sensitivity or historical responsibility.”); see also ROBERTA 
ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY:  FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 160 (2009) (“An author’s external work embodies her personal meaning and intended message 
and is thus reflective of her individual, intrinsic, creative process.  No one, not even the author’s spouse 
and children, can substitute a personal judgment regarding the substance of the author’s meaning and 
message.”); Richard A. Posner, Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095, 
1097 (2011) (noting the difficulties of determining intentions of right holders in the law in general). 
 212. See, e.g., Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 665 F. Supp. 652, 658 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (noting 
that the court should focus on defendant’s conduct and the deterrent effect of the sanction imposed in 
determining the amount of statutory damages for copyright infringement). 
 213. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 214. Id. 
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Steven Spielberg and the four other producers of E.T..215  Like the plaintiff in 
Anderson v. Stallone,216 Litchfield accused a prominent media entity of copying her 
unknown work. 
Many content providers in the entertainment industry fear similar suits and seek 
to avoid being the target of them.217  Limiting the general public’s ability to create 
derivative works is a way for traditional content providers to insulate themselves 
against liability:  if unauthorized creators could assert rights to their own derivative 
works based on popular characters and story lines, not only would established 
content providers face competition, but they would also run the risk of being 
accused of copyright infringement when creating their own, authorized derivative 
works. 
It is not surprising that some traditional content providers would object to 
increasing the ability of unauthorized creators to produce derivative works.  The 
system, as it currently functions, favors many of these entities, which have the 
leverage and resources to obtain licenses to works likely to be exploited in 
derivative form, eliminating otherwise valuable competition.218  Although strike 
suits may occur, they are not a sufficient reason to so severely limit unauthorized 
derivative works.  Claims such as these can be vetted on the merits.  In the 
Litchfield case, for example, Universal was able to show a lack of copying.219  
Moreover, Universal made this showing at the summary judgment stage, even 
though the issue on which the court decided the case—lack of substantial similarity 
 
 215. Id. at 1355. 
 216. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 1989); see supra Part II (discussing case). 
 217. The notice on The Walt Disney Company’s website is typical of how large corporate content 
providers approach unsolicited submission of creative work to avoid such problems: 
While we are always happy to hear from our Guests, it is the long-standing policy of The Walt 
Disney Company not to accept unsolicited submissions of creative material.  This is to avoid any 
misunderstandings if your ideas are similar to those we have developed independently.  We must 
therefore request that you do not send to us any original creative materials such as screenplays, 
stories, song lyrics, original artwork, etc. 
Any communication or material you do transmit to the Site by electronic mail or otherwise will 
be treated as non-confidential and non-proprietary.  Anything you transmit or post may be used 
by The Walt Disney Company or its affiliates for any purpose, including, but not limited to, 
reproduction, disclosure, transmission, publication, broadcast, and posting. 
Contact Us, Terms and Conditions, DISNEY, http://disney.go.com/guestservices/contact (last visited Oct. 
5, 2013).  As noted previously, the traditional film industry is particularly dependent on preexisting 
works.  See Dietz supra note 56 (citing study demonstrating that a large number of movies are sequels, 
remakes and adaptations). 
 218. As then-Judge Breyer explained in the context of book publishing: 
[Book publishers’] power to accumulate . . . exclusive licenses to publish may nonetheless, at 
least in theory, inhibit . . . competition.  This power may, for example, allow a few publishers to 
build “stables” of popular writers.  The presence of such a “stable” may strongly attract other 
writers with valuable manuscripts and make it more difficult for a newcomer to obtain the 
promising manuscripts necessary to become established in the publishing industry. 
Breyer, supra note 66, at 318.  A limited number of publishing houses may also decrease the 
opportunities for new authors, who may thus be doubly disadvantaged by the limitations on their 
inability to rely on preexisting works for inspiration. 
 219. 736 F.2d at 1358, 1355. 
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between the copyrighted work and the defendants’ work—is a fact-intensive 
issue.220  The Anderson case was similarly decided in the defendants’ favor at the 
summary judgment stage.221 
Another objection copyright owners might raise is that a more permissive 
attitude toward the unauthorized use of copyrighted works for derivative purposes 
reduces the economic incentive to create in the first instance.  It is questionable, 
however, whether copyright law is a motivating factor in general, let alone with 
respect to any particular author, in the preparation of creative works.222  To the 
extent that copyright law does supply such an incentive, it is further questionable 
whether the exclusive right to prepare derivative works in particular is needed to 
provide it.223  As now-Justice Stephen Breyer has noted, many authors of popular 
novels, which are common sources of inspiration for derivative works, are already 
wealthy, have a considerable talent for writing, or write for the literary, rather than 
monetary, value of their work.224  Thus a purported decrease in income that would 
result from less copyright protection would not be a disincentive to create new 
works.225  In light of the lack of empirical evidence on the incentive effect of 
copyright law, striking the balance in favor of a speculation about the creation of 
new works, at the expense of works that have already actually been created, is 
unwise.  Moreover, the approach outlined in this Article does allow the holder of 
the copyright in the preexisting work the space to exploit the derivative right if 
desired, because that factor is considered in the injunctive relief analysis.  In 
addition, the author of the initial work still enjoys the benefit of being “the 
original,”226 and will be compensated with damages proportionate to the value of 
her preexisting work’s contribution to the derivative work. 
The chief policy-based argument against blocking copyrights is based on a 
moral or natural rights justification for copyright law.227  This philosophy of 
copyright law is rooted in the belief that copyright protection is necessary to 
preserve the integrity of an author’s creation as an extension of her personality or 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
 222. Many scholars have cast doubt on the idea that copyright law is an effective incentive in the 
creation of the initial work.  See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 43, at 2008 (noting that intellectual property 
“law’s ability to promote creativity not only may be limited, but could even be detrimental, to the extent 
it turns an artist’s or inventor’s internally motivated activity into one conducted for the copyright or 
patent prize.”); Yen supra note 58, at 82 (“Courts seldom have hard evidence about either the quantity 
or quality of the creative activity that copyright fosters.”).  Under this thinking, the derivative right, one 
step removed from the initial work, is arguably even more questionable as an incentive. 
 223. See supra note 10 (noting other rights possessed by the copyright holder). 
 224. See Breyer, supra note 66, at 311-12. 
 225. Id. at 312. 
 226. Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
Intellectual Property:  Review Essay of Lawrence Lessig, The Future Of Ideas, and Siva Vaidhyanathan, 
Copyrights and Copywrongs, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 487-88 (2002) (noting that audiences would 
be far more interested in seeing George Lucas’ sequel to Star Wars than a version created by the author 
of the article). 
 227. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 19, at 2659 n.15 (suggesting that moral rights justification is the 
best explanation for the lack of blocking copyrights doctrine). 
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being.228  Relatedly, some courts and commentators have espoused an “author-as-
God” view of copyright law that would grant authors broad control over their 
works.229  Under this theory, derivative rights in particular would provide an author 
the potential means to control later uses of her work that might impact her persona, 
reputation or creative identity. 
One response to this argument is simply to reject it on the ground that U.S. 
copyright laws are based on a utilitarian rationale, driven by economic 
considerations.230  The Copyright Act allows for only limited recognition of moral 
rights, and only with respect to a very narrow class of works.231  It is precisely 
because of the potential emotional attachment, accepted by moral rights theories, 
that an author may have to her work that the law must intervene to make possible 
beneficial commercial transactions that might otherwise not occur due to an 
author’s categorical unwillingness to reach any agreement.232  Moreover, a moral 
rights argument is generally problematic on the ground that appeal to such fairness-
based theories can eventually lead to overly expansive rights.233 
Yet the moral rights justification presents an argument deserving of a more 
measured response.  Although moral rights are unlikely to become the predominant 
 
 228. See, e.g., SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 23, at 18 (describing how, under a natural rights 
theory of copyright law, “[a]uthors are . . . seen as bearing a personal relationship with their creative 
expression”); id. at 138 (regarding moral rights regimes in countries outside the United States, noting 
that “[w]orks of authorship also reflect their creator’s personality in that they are unique extensions of 
the author herself.  Moral rights are said to recognize the dignity and worth of individuals”); see also 
Breyer, supra note 66, at 284 (noting an argument based on an “author’s ‘moral rights’ to reap the fruit 
of his labors or to control what he has created”). 
 229. See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1384 (N.D. Ga. 2001) 
(“The right to answer those questions [about the fate of characters in Gone with the Wind] . . . legally 
belongs to Ms. Mitchell’s heirs, not [the defendant].”), rev’d, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that the copyright 
holder has “the right, within broad limits, to curb the development of . . . a derivative market by refusing 
to license a copyrighted work or by doing so only on terms the copyright owner finds acceptable.”); 
Breyer, supra note 66, at 284 (recounting an argument by “a noted French lawyer” that “a book cannot 
be printed without the author’s permission, for just as ‘the heavens and the earth belong to [God], 
because they are the work of his word . . . [s]o the author of a book is its complete master, and as such 
can dispose of it as he chooses’”). 
 230. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 168, at 53 (“The utilitarian position always has been premised, at 
least implicitly, on economic reasoning.  In recent years, [copyright law’s] economic foundations have 
become more and more explicit.”); see also KWALL, supra note 211, at xiii (“American copyright law 
rewards economic incentives almost exclusively”); Lemley, supra note 19, at 1034 (arguing that the 
rationale for derivative rights “should stand or fall on its economic merits”).  Scholars have certainly 
argued in favor of greater recognition of moral rights, but the utilitarian theory remains authoritative.  
KWALL, supra note 211, at 6. 
 231. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting authors of “work[s] of visual art” the right to prevent 
violations of their moral rights); id. § 101 (defining “work of visual art” narrowly to exclude many 
categories of works such as “any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied 
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical”). 
 232.  See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting authors’ potential emotional attachment to 
copyrighted works). 
 233. See, e.g., JOYCE ET AL., supra note 168, at 58 (noting that theories based on an appeal to 
fundamental fairness often contain no internal checks, which can result in the protection of every 
product of the mind for an unlimited period). 
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theory of copyright protection,234 U.S. copyright law has grown more receptive to a 
moral rights justification as it has made concessions to international law,235 and the 
issue accordingly warrants additional consideration. 
Even granting room for some acceptance of moral rights, the approach to 
damages for unauthorized derivative works outlined in this Article can 
accommodate moral rights concerns.  Drawing again upon tort law, authors can 
seek to establish the pecuniary value of alleged reputational harms, as is the case 
with defamation actions.  This potential harm would manifest in certain categories 
of works more than others.236  For example, a painting may be more likely to 
embody the creator’s self, as contemplated by the moral rights theory, than a map.  
In this sense, then, the proposal herein is more favorable to the creators of 
preexisting works than existing law, as courts generally have not been receptive to 
these types of noneconomic harms in arriving at damages for copyright 
infringement.237  Courts and juries should be skeptical of claims of reputational 
harm,238 but, if proven, they could compensate for it.239 
Finally, there also exists a practical objection based on the difficulty of parsing 
out the respective contributions from the preexisting and derivative works.240  It is 
necessary, however, that a derivative work be significantly different from the 
preexisting work in order to even obtain protection in the first place, and the author 
of the derivative work appropriately bears the burden of showing this difference.241  
This baseline requirement for a work to even be considered a derivative aids in 
severability at the outset. 
 
 234. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits:  The Norms of Copyright 
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1019 n.43 (“Despite occasional 
flirtations, American law by and large has not adopted th[e] European notion of droit moral; and it 
should not do so, at least not without substantial limitations.  The notion, as interpreted abroad, seems to 
ignore the moral rights of audiences . . . and may pay insufficient respect to values Americans associate 
with the First Amendment.”). 
 235. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 168, at 55 (noting that the natural rights justification “has animated 
successive revisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, up to 
and including the 1971 Paris Revision, to which the United States adhered in 1989”); see also Deidré A. 
Keller, Recognizing the Derivative Works Right as a Moral Right:  A Case Comparison and Proposal, 
63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 511, 515 (2012) (arguing that the right to prepare derivative works should be 
expressly recognized as a moral right and accordingly limited to the life of the author). 
 236. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 168, at 56 (arguing that the moral rights justification “applies better 
to some categories of copyrighted works than others”). 
 237. See Yen, supra note 58, at 106 (noting, in context of fair use analysis for parodies, “courts’ 
refusal to count the harm of criticism on the author’s emotional welfare in its intuitive cost-benefit 
analysis”). 
 238. See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 3, 5-6 (2001) (discussing problems with romanticized concepts of authorship and the process 
of making creative works). 
 239. This may, admittedly, be difficult to prove.  See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 135, at 24 
(“When a copyright holder publishes a work, she voluntarily discloses the work to the world.  And 
because the copyright holder is no longer in exclusive physical control of the work, there is no reason to 
think that others will impute the defendant’s message to her.”). 
 240. See supra note 123 (noting the Anderson court’s concern with severability) 
 241. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that the derivative work be 
significantly or substantially different from the preexisting work). 
37.1 MULLALLY ARTICLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/25/2013  12:51 PM 
2013] BLOCKING COPYRIGHTS REVISITED 97 
Moreover, the type of partitioning required by blocking copyrights, while no 
doubt difficult, is common in other copyright cases.  For example, when a 
defendant has used both protectable and nonprotectable elements of a plaintiff’s 
work in cases that do not involve an alleged violation of the right to produce 
derivative works, courts may engage in “dissection,” whereby nonprotectable 
elements are separated out from those that are protectable for purposes of assessing 
copying in the basic infringement analysis.242  Similarly, courts in copyright 
disputes must separate expression (eligible for copyright protection) from ideas 
(ineligible for copyright protection)243 and, in determining damages, parse out the 
value of an infringed work when used as part of a larger infringing work.244  
Severability is thus already a part of copyright jurisprudence. 
To the extent that additional tools are needed to assist with partitioning, scholars 
have suggested useful methods to allocate rights when a creative work is the 
product of collaboration, as well as models for dividing out the contributions as 
between the initial creator and a derivative author.245  If all these tools fail, it only 
benefits the author of the preexisting work and maintains the status quo.  A 
derivative work can be protected only to the extent that it can be separated from the 
preexisting work,246 and the derivative author bears the risk that severability may 
be impossible. 
Rather than being a weakness, this severability requirement makes an equitable 
rule of recovery for improvers even more compelling in the realm of copyright law 
as compared with personal and real property.  Whereas cases granting relief to an 
 
 242. See Olson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Aliotti v. R. 
Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987)) (applying rule that “no substantial similarity may be 
found under the intrinsic test where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in expression 
arise from the use of common ideas”); Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int’l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 361 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (applying dissection analysis); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 100, at § 13.03[A] 
(explaining dissection analysis). 
 243. Judge Hand set out his famous “levels of abstraction” test in Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp.: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality 
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no 
more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only 
of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, 
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. . . .  Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, 
and nobody ever can.  
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 244. Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (dividing damages based on 
parties’ respective contributions to work), aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990). 
 245. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research:  Conflicts on Authorship, 
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1220 (2000) (describing statutory alternative to 
current provisions for works made for hire and joint authorship that would provide proportional rights 
based on collaborators’ respective contributions to a work); Ghosh, supra note 226, at 488-89 (drawing 
on principles of cellular biology to posit nucleus and fission models as tools in interpreting definition of 
‘derivative work’); Mandel, supra note 42, at 311 (suggesting a standard for joint authorship in 
copyright law that would require a “not insignificant” contribution, of content not available in the public 
domain, to an original aspect of the work). 
 246. See supra Part I.A.2 and Part II (discussing separability). 
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improver of tangible property often result in a winner-takes-all result because the 
property cannot be enjoyed by two users simultaneously,247 such an outcome is not 
necessary in the copyright context:  the nonrivalrous nature of intellectual property 
allows the owner of the preexisting work to continue to enjoy rights to her own 
creative expression, without requiring confiscation of either party’s work.248 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Sir Isaac Newton’s adage, “If I have seen further it is by standing on [the] 
shoulders of Giants,” is well known.249  Less well known, however, is that Newton 
was doing precisely what he described even as he wrote his famous words:  
Newton derived the phrase from the twelfth-century philosopher, Bernard of 
Chartres,250 who likened society to “dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. . . .  
[W]e see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener 
vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their 
gigantic stature.”251  Rather than detract from it, this borrowing only reinforces the 
truth of Newton’s celebrated metaphor. 
Copyright owners’ “dog-in-the-manger” behavior ignores the reality that 
Newton correctly acknowledged, and we should be particularly wary of such 
holdout activity in the context of derivative works.  Courts should accordingly 
adopt principles of blocking copyrights and the more equitable approach to 
remedies outlined in this Article to account in more nuanced ways for the 
contributions made by creators of unauthorized derivative works.  A blocking 
copyrights doctrine is consistent with not only the statutory language and 
legislative history of the Copyright Act but also the policies behind copyright law.  
Indeed, it is the opposite result—denying rights to derivative authors for their 
original contributions and penalizing them with an injunction or excessive 
damages—that is counterproductive to the copyright system’s purpose of 
promoting progress in creative endeavors.  A doctrine of blocking copyrights 
effectively furthers the incentive-based purpose of the copyright laws in favor of 
derivative authors without compromising incentives for authors of preexisting 
works, because the latter will still be compensated for the value of the preexisting 
work. 
 
 247. See, e.g., supra Part I.B (noting that a title to improved real property may pass in its entirety 
to the improver). 
 248. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the nonrivalrous nature of copyrighted 
works). 
 249. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676), reprinted in ROBERT K. MERTON, 
ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS:  A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT, THE POST-ITALIANTE VERSION 31 (1993). 
 250. Id. at 40, 177-78 (noting Bernard of Chartres’ statement, “[i]n comparison to the ancients, we 
stand like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants”); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Wealth Without 
Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472, 1476 n.5 (2007) (“Newton borrowed [the] phrase from earlier writers, 
and the first known use of the phrase was by Bernard of Chartres, in approximately 1130.”). 
 251. THE METALOGICON OF JOHN OF SALISBURY:  A TWELFTH-CENTURY DEFENSE OF THE 
VERBAL AND LOGICAL ARTS OF THE TRIVIUM 167 (Daniel D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1955) 
(1159). 
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Although a blocking copyrights approach has at least implicit support from 
some courts, a clear enunciation and further delineation of the doctrine is needed, 
coupled with a modification of remedies determinations.  This Article suggests an 
avenue for revisiting and reinvigorating blocking copyrights and proposes criteria 
with which to redesign remedies for copyright infringement by unauthorized 
improvers.  In doing so, the Article draws in particular on principles from tort and 
property law, focusing on aspects of those bodies of law that temper the remedies 
available when property interests are infringed by a subsequent user of property 
who adds her own, separable contributions.  This Article argues that those 
principles should be incorporated into copyright law, and that they can be 
conceptually tailored, consistent with key tenets behind the copyright system, to 
arrive at a remedy scheme that reduces copyright’s harsh barriers to entry for 
unauthorized derivative works and stimulates the continued, cumulative creativity 
that is necessary for a rich intellectual property marketplace. 
 
